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Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party∗
Thomas R. Palfrey Kirill Pogorelskiy
September 11, 2017
Abstract
How does communication among voters affect turnout? In a laboratory experiment, subjects,
divided into two competing parties, choose between costly voting and abstaining. Pre-play com-
munication treatments, relative to the No Communication control, are Public Communication
(subjects exchange public messages through computers) and Party Communication (messages
are public within one’s own party). Communication benefits the majority party by increasing its
turnout margin, hence its winning probability. Party communication increases turnout; public
communication decreases total turnout with a low voting cost. With communication, there is
no support for Nash equilibrium and limited consistency with correlated equilibrium.
JEL codes: C72, C92, D72
Keywords: voter turnout, pre-play communication, lab experiment, correlated equi-
librium
How does pre-play communication among economic agents affect collective decisions? Prominent
game-theoretic models for situations such as voting, contributing to a public good, multi-lateral
bargaining, auctions, and entry games, to name a few, typically discard the availability of pre-
play communication among the players. They do so, in part, because of an increased complexity
of the equilibrium analysis under communication, and, in part, because original equilibria are
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maintained due to the non-binding nature of pre-play communication. Many experimental studies
show, however, that pre-play communication can have significant effects on outcomes in many
different settings.1
In this paper, we attempt to explore the general principles behind pre-play communication in a
laboratory experiment on voter turnout, an application that combines features of free-riding and
team competition. The game is very simple: two groups of voters of commonly known different sizes
(think political parties) compete against each other in a winner-take-all election under plurality
rule. Voters simultaneously decide on a binary decision: vote or abstain. Voting is costly, with a
commonly known cost of voting that is the same for all voters.
In the turnout game without communication, each player decides whether or not to vote indepen-
dently of others. The game-theoretic analysis of this case (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983) shows that,
generally, there will be either one or two quasi-symmetric Nash equilibria, in which all members
of the same party mix with the same probability of voting. There are also asymmetric equilib-
ria, which we do not consider here, as they are logically implausible without a device to break
symmetries.2
With communication, the formal structure of the turnout game changes dramatically, as individual
turnout decisions can now be correlated. Allowing for correlation greatly expands the set of equi-
libria. In fact, the game with unrestricted communication admits an infinite number of equilibria,
with expected total turnout ranging between nearly zero and twice the size of the minority party
for all positive voting costs, such that abstention is not a dominant strategy (Pogorelskiy, 2017).
We study the effects of unmediated pre-play communication on turnout. Before making their
decisions, subjects engage in free-form communication by broadcasting computer chat messages
to subsets of players. We consider two cases: public communication, where players can exchange
public messages visible to all participants; and party communication, where players can exchange
messages that are public only within their own party (majority or minority). These communication
protocols have broad analogs to communication that occurs in real elections. For example, car
1See, e.g., Cooper et al. (1992), Agranov and Tergiman (2014), Agranov and Yariv (2015), Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1991), and Palfrey et al. (2015).
2See Alo´s-Ferrer and Kuzmics (2013) and Kuzmics and Rogers (2010).
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bumper stickers can be interpreted as public messages, while Facebook status updates, visible only
to one’s own group of friends or social connections, are examples of group-based public messages.3
A refinement of correlated equilibrium, subcorrelated equilibrium is used to characterise the equi-
libria with party communication (Pogorelskiy, 2015). While our experiment (and the model) does
not have any explicit centralized mobilisation efforts per se, one can view the kind of decentralised
communication studied here as corresponding to neighbourhood information exchanges (Großer
and Schram, 2006), conversations and interactions with family and friends, or communication via
social media.4
In addition to the communication treatment, the experiment varies two other crucial parameters of
the model: the voting cost (“low” cost vs. “high” cost) and the relative party sizes (large vs. small
minority). This leads to a 3× 2× 2 design with a total of 12 different treatments. A novel feature
of this study is the sensitivity of turnout to changes in these parameters under our restrictions on
communication, which allows us to identify interaction effects between communication mode and
key parameters of the theoretical model.
The main finding of the experiment is that communication affects turnout for the majority and
minority parties in much different ways. Specifically, communication benefits the majority party, as
it increases the expected turnout margin relative to no communication, and, hence, increases the
expected margin of victory for the majority and the probability of the majority winning. The finding
is unambiguous, robust, and quite strong. We observe it in all treatments, for both communication
protocols, both low and high voting costs, and both large and small majorities. Furthermore,
in almost all cases, the effects are statistically significant and large in magnitude. This result is
not only strong, but also surprising (at least to us), in the sense that it is not predicted by any
theoretical model of which we are aware, including our correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium
models.5
3Bond et al. (2012) studied effects of a very influential group-based message in a turnout setting featuring the “I
Voted” button on top of Facebook users’ newsfeed.
4Field experimental studies, which usually isolate a particular communication mechanism, have shown significant
but mixed evidence (Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber et al., 2011), which is perhaps not surprising, given the
variety of different ways in which people communicate. Effectiveness of political communication depends on complex
interactions of different communication mechanisms, political actors, and institutional structures (Druckman, 2014).
5The theoretical model of Denter and Sisak (2015) shows that, under certain conditions, perfect polls (a restricted
form of communication) can create momentum in favour of the front-running candidate. The underlying mechanism,
however, is totally different, as in their model, two candidates strategically choose investments in their political
3
The experiment also generates three other findings that complement this main finding.
First, the communication design of the experiment allows us to test the consistency of experimental
data under communication with correlated equilibrium. Although correlated equilibria have been
largely ignored in the experimental study of pre-play communication, they are particularly well-
suited for the analysis of such games.6 This is especially the case with our design, as it includes
both public and party communication mechanisms, which require somewhat different variations
on the correlated equilibrium concept. We design several new tests to check for the consistency
with correlated equilibrium and find that voting cost plays an important role here: with low
cost and group communication, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the data are generated by a
correlated equilibrium, while with high cost, this is no longer the case for either communication
treatment. On the other hand, in almost all communication treatments, we reject the hypothesis
that voters’ individual decisions are independent, implying no support for Nash equilibrium under
communication.
Second, we identify an interaction effect between the structure of communication and the cost of
voting. Party communication increases total turnout. With a low voting cost, public communication
decreases total turnout. With a high voting cost, public communication does not significantly affect
total turnout. Thus, we identify a cost/communication interaction effect, whereby cost consider-
ations appear to be an important factor in participation decisions under communication, which
ties in with some existing empirical results (Brady and McNulty, 2011; Hodler and Stutzer, 2015).
Surprisingly, public communication, at an election stage where voters’ preferences have already
been formed, can be detrimental to getting out the vote.
Third, we find that turnout rates are affected by the voting cost and election competitiveness. The-
oretically, turnout in each party is higher when costs are lower. We observe this cost effect in all
treatments, except with public communication. We also observe positive effects of ex ante election
competitiveness on turnout (as measured by the relative party sizes), holding the other treatment
dimensions constant.7
campaigns, trying to influence the decisive voter’s probabilistic choice.
6A notable exception is Moreno and Wooders (1998). See also Cason and Sharma (2007), and Duffy and Feltovich
(2010) for studies of abstract games with recommended play.
7The cost and competition effects have support from other experiments (Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Herrera et al.,
2014; Kartal, 2015).
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 1, we provide a brief literature review.
Section 2 lays out the theoretical model of voter turnout, including formal definitions of correlated
and subcorrelated equilibrium as it applies the the voter turnout game. In Section 3, we describe
the details of our experimental design. Section 4 presents our findings at the electorate level and
party level. Section 5 concludes. Additional estimation details are in Appendix A. Experimental
instructions are in Appendix B. Experimental data and programs are available online.
1 Related Literature
Several studies have investigated the effects of restrictive communication mechanisms – such as
neighbourhood information exchange and polls – on voter turnout. Großer and Schram (2006)
consider the effects of communication in the form of neighbourhood information exchange. In their
model, every two voters form a neighbourhood, with one being an early voter (sender) and one a
late voter (receiver). They find that information exchange increases turnout, although these results
seem to be sensitive to the analysed sender-receiver protocol. Großer and Schram (2010), and
Agranov et al. (2017) study the effects of polls on turnout and welfare in the lab.8 In particular,
Agranov et al. (2017) show that polls do not have negative welfare effects.
More relevant to the current paper, the authors also find evidence for voting with the winner, where
a voter is more likely to turn out if she thinks that her preferred candidate is more likely to win.
While this ties in nicely with our main finding that communication benefits the majority party by
increasing its expected margin of victory, the environment, the communication mechanism, and
the results of the two papers differ in important ways. Concerning the difference in environments,
Agranov et al.’s explores information revelation in a game with uncertainty about the distribution
of preferences. Voters have incomplete information and private signals about the number of voters
favouring each candidate. Prior to polling, voters do not even know whether or not they are in
the majority party, and polls serve as an information aggregation device to reveal simultaneously
to all voters the relative sizes of the two candidates’ support in the electorate. By contrast, this
study focuses on an environment where the number of voters favouring each candidate is common
8Morton et al. (2015), in a natural experiment, estimate that exit polls decrease turnout and increase bandwagon
voting. Theoretic models of polls include McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) and Denter and Sisak (2015).
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knowledge among all the voters from the very start of the game, so communication can only serve
as a coordination device to allow for correlation in the turnout decisions of the voters; no actual
information is transmitted. Concerning the difference in mechanism, the communication technology
in Agranov et al. is very limited, being only a poll, where each voter sends a vote message to the
experimenter, and then only the aggregate vote count in the poll is reported back to all voters.
By contrast, our subjects use a free-form computerised chat with public (i.e., multi-way) messages
that do not provide any new information about the environment, and only serve as a coordination
device. In our group-communication treatment voters from different parties communicate through
separate chats, so communication is partially private. The results are also different. They find that
information transmission with polls increases majority participation rates but decreases minority
turnout rates. The effects move turnout rates in opposite directions, mobilising both a positive
(for the majority) and a negative (for the minority) bandwagon, triggered by the revelation of the
true distribution of voter preferences. While we observe this effect in some of our treatments, we
find that in other treatments, communication affects participation rates in both parties in the same
direction, with the effect on majority party turnout being relatively stronger (when both parties’
turnout rates increase), and relatively weaker (when both parties’ turnout rates decrease).
In theory, pre-play communication can replicate the effects of both polls and neighbourhood infor-
mation exchanges. Schram and Sonnemans (1996b) study Schram and van Winden’s (1991) social
pressure turnout model in the lab and find that communication increases turnout. There are two
groups, each with opinion leaders who produce social pressure on others to turn out. One of the
basic predictions of that model is that communication increases turnout. In their experiment, for
five minutes, there was oral communication among the members of the same group, after which
five more rounds of the game without further communication were played. This is different from
having pre-play communication in each round, as in our paper.
Another related paper is Kittel et al. (2014). They study three-party elections with costly voting,
varying voter preference types (swing voters, who have strict rankings over three parties, vs. par-
tisans, who strictly prefer one party but are indifferent between the two less preferred ones); party
labels; and pre-play communication protocol (public across groups vs. public within groups, as in
our experiment). Kittel et al. find that communication increases both turnout and the amount
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of strategic voting. The effects of the communication protocol on turnout depend on voter pref-
erences and are nuanced. In particular, swing voters and partisans show different turnout rates:
swing voters assigned to their second choice are more likely to turn out in the “all-chat” than in
the “party-chat,” while swings assigned to their first choice, as well as partisans, show no differ-
ence. While we use similar communication treatments, our results are not directly comparable since
three-party elections introduce a completely different motive for voting, and introduce additional
strategic considerations.9
2 The Model
In this section, we provide some theoretical background for the pivotal-voter model of Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983) on which our experiment builds. There is a set of voters N with |N | = n, divided
into two parties, NA and NB, with a number of supporters nA > nB = n− nA > 0. Voters in each
party decide between voting for their respective party (action 1) or abstaining (action 0). Each
player i’s action space is Si = {0, 1}. The set of joint voting profiles is S = S1 × · · · × Sn, i.e.,
S = {(si)i∈N |si ∈ {0, 1}}; and the set of all probability distributions over S is ∆(S). Player i’s
utility at an action profile (si, s−i) is denoted Ui(si, s−i); and her expected utility from si given
belief about others’ actions σ−i is Ui(si, σ−i) ≡ Eσ−iUi(si, ·). The election is decided by a simple
plurality rule, with ties broken randomly. Voting is costly, with c ∈ (0, 1/2) being the common
voting cost. Each player i’s utility is normalised to 1 if the voter’s preferred party wins, 1/2 if
there is a tie, and 0 otherwise, minus the voting cost, if i decides to vote. The game has complete
information, and the only uncertainty from a player’s point of view comes from not knowing what,
exactly, everybody else is going to choose. Each voter would ideally prefer her party to win the
election without her actually voting, so the game combines a free-rider problem with a collective
action problem in each party. Rational voters trade off the expected benefits from voting against
9 Several strands of the literature are less related to our paper. One studies the effects of deliberation on jury voting,
where abstention is not allowed (Guarnaschelli et al., 2000; Goeree and Yariv, 2011). Another studies the performance
of the rational turnout models in the lab but without communication among voters (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996a;
Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Duffy and Tavits, 2008; Herrera et al., 2014; Kartal, 2015). There are also studies of
communication within and between teams in team contests in which members choose individual effort levels that
determine the joint team output. See, in particular, Sutter and Strassmair (2009), who find that within-team
communication increases average effort levels. Balliet (2010) surveys studies of communication in social dilemmas
with a focus on the prisoner’s dilemma.
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the cost, so the probability of their vote changing the election outcome is the key factor. In an
equilibrium, this so-called pivot probability is determined endogenously.
In a quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium (NE), each player i who prefers party Nj , j ∈ {A,B}, mixes
between voting for j and abstaining with the same probability q = qj conditional on the party,
and given these strategies, each player must be indifferent between the two actions: Ui(0, q−i) =
Ui(1, q−i). The equilibrium voting probabilities are determined from the following two equations:
2c = Pr(i ∈ NA is pivotal) (1)
2c = Pr(i ∈ NB is pivotal) (2)
Expressing the pivotal probability via equilibrium voting probabilities qA and qB, we obtain
2c =
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
qaA(1− qA)nA−1−aqaB(1− qB)nB−a
+
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
qaA(1− qA)nA−1−aqa+1B (1− qB)nB−a−1 (3)
2c =
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
b
)(
nB − 1
b
)
qbA(1− qA)nA−bqbB(1− qB)nB−1−b
+
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
b+ 1
)(
nB − 1
b
)
qb+1A (1− qA)nA−b−1qbB(1− qB)nB−1−b (4)
In both equations, the first sum on the right hand side is the equilibrium probability of a single vote
to make a tie, the second is the equilibrium probability of a single vote to break the tie in favour
of the preferred party. Probabilities of a tie and near tie (i.e., a tie ± one vote) provide a measure
of the expected closeness of the election, as well as the probability of the minority party winning
(the upset rate), which affects a measure of social welfare. The equilibrium logic leads from the
primitives of the model (party sizes and voting cost) to predictions about these probabilities and
about the turnout rates in each party and in the whole electorate.10 The equilibrium probability
10There are other, asymmetric Nash equilibria in this class of games – see Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) – but our
experimental design makes them infeasible to sustain.
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of a joint voting profile with a total votes for NA and b total votes for NB is
ν(a, b) ≡
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
qaA(1− qA)nA−aqbB(1− qB)nB−b (5)
A correlated equilibrium (CE), developed in Aumann (1974, 1987), is a probability distribution
over joint action profiles such that at every profile, each player’s choice is a best response under the
posterior distribution conditional on that choice. Formally, a correlated equilibrium is µ ∈ ∆(S)
such that for all i ∈ N, si, s′i ∈ Si
∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(si, s−i)
(Ui(si, s−i)− Ui(s′i, s−i)) ≥ 0 (6)
In a CE of the turnout game, unlike Nash equilibrium, there are two best response conditions for
each player: conditional on deciding to vote, and conditional on deciding to abstain. Every CE, µ,
is defined by the following 2n inequalities (in addition to the standard probability constraints) for
each i ∈ N :
Pr(i is pivotal | i abstains;µ) ≤ 2c
Pr(i is pivotal | i votes;µ) ≥ 2c
The main difference between NE and CE is that in the latter, players’ strategies can be correlated,
while in a Nash equilibrium, all players decide whether to vote or abstain independently. Thus,
every Nash equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium, but (in a formal sense) almost all correlated
equilibria of the turnout game are not Nash equilibria. Using the formula for conditional probability,
each pair of CE inequalities can be simplified:
1
2 − c
c
Pr(i is pivotal & abstains|µ) ≤ Pr(i is non-pivotal & abstains|µ) (7)
1
2 − c
c
Pr(i is pivotal & votes|µ) ≥ Pr(i is non-pivotal & votes|µ) (8)
To check consistency with a correlated equilibrium, we need frequency estimates of the joint turnout
profiles from the data. The number of such profiles in a n-person electorate is 2n, making it infeasible
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to estimate frequencies with our data. To circumvent this problem, we reduce the number of joint
profiles to a manageable size by combining all the profiles that have the same number of votes from
each party and differ only by the identity of those voting and abstaining. This reduction implicitly
assumes that such profiles are equally likely. For example, we assume that the following profiles
have equal probability: a profile with all of the minority voting and with voters 1, 2, and 3 of the
majority voting; and a profile with all of the minority voting and with voters 4, 5, and 6 of the
majority voting. To state this assumption formally, let µ(zi, a, b) denote the probability of any joint
profile where player i plays strategy zi, and, among the other n − 1 players, a players turn out in
group NA and b players turn out in group NB (where “groups” correspond to the majority and
minority party, respectively, in the context of our experiment).
ASSUMPTION 1. (Group-symmetric distributions). We consider only distributions over joint vot-
ing profiles that satisfy the following restrictions:
∀i ∈ NA, ∀a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1},∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} : µ(0i, a, b) = µ(1i, a− 1, b)
∀k ∈ NB, ∀b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, ∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA} : µ(0k, a, b) = µ(1k, a, b− 1)
Applying Assumption 1, we now have a total of (nA + 1)(nB + 1) different profiles for which fre-
quencies can be estimated from the data. We can now simply write
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b for the probability
of a joint profile with a votes from party NA and b votes from party NB (cf. Nash-induced joint
probability ν(a, b) in (5).) For a group-symmetric correlated equilibrium, conditions (7)–(8) can be
simplified (Pogorelskiy, 2017) and written as a system of four inequalities: two for a player in NA,
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and two for a player in NB, with respect to (nA + 1)(nB + 1) unknowns, µa,b:
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
≤
nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b (9)
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
≥
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b (10)
and
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
≤
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b (11)
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
≥
nA∑
a=2
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b (12)
Pogorelskiy (2017), in an analysis of correlated equilibria in turnout games, characterises the bounds
of the set of CE in these games. In particular, CE can have total expected turnout of up to twice
the size of the minority party when the minority is large (i.e., the minority’s size is at least 50% that
of the majority), and up to the majority size in the remaining, small minority, case. Such turnout
rates are generally higher than in a quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium. CE presume unrestricted
communication among all players.
A Subcorrelated equilibrium(SCE), proposed in Pogorelskiy (2015), is a correlated equilibrium with
additional restrictions on the structure of admissible correlations. Formally, a SCE is defined
relative to a partition of the set of players into K disjoint groups, Π = {N1, ..., Nk, ..., NK}, and is
given by a joint distribution on strategy profiles µ ∈ ∆(S) that satisfies the incentive constraints
given by (6), such that µ is generated by K independent probability distributions, each over its
11
respective group sub-profiles. That is, the joint distribution, µ is decomposable as a product of K
distributions: there exist (γ1, ..., γK) with γk ∈ ∆(Sk) such that
µ(s) =
K∏
k=1
γk(s|Nk), (13)
for all s ∈ S, where s|Nk := ((si)i∈Nk) is group Nk’s action sub-profile in profile s.
Thus subcorrelated equilibrium nests both Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium as extreme
special cases: In the definition of subcorrelated equilibrium, K = 1; and in a Nash equilibrium, K =
N . Note that every subcorrelated equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium, just as every Nash
equilibrium is a correlated equilibrium, and finer partitions (weakly) reduce the set of subcorrelated
equilibria by imposing additional decomposability constraints. For the turnout game, we consider
the subcorrelated equilibria defined by the two groups (K = 2) corresponding to the majority and
minority parties. Thus, in this setting SCE requires that the joint distribution over all-electorate
voting profiles is a CE that is also a product of the two mixed party turnout distributions, one for
each party. Thus, in a subcorrelated equilibrium, votes can be correlated within, but not across the
two parties, implicitly capturing a restriction that any communication between voters takes place
within parties.
The effect of this constraint depends on the size of the minority (Pogorelskiy, 2017). With a
sufficiently large minority, one can limit communication in this way (i.e., to remain unrestricted
only within each party) and still get twice the size of the minority as the theoretical upper bound
on the expected total turnout. In contrast, the decomposability restriction of independence across
parties is binding in the small minority case and implies an upper bound with lower turnout than
in CE.
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3 Experimental Design
3.1 Experimental Treatments and Theoretical Predictions
In the experiment, we vary the sizes of the parties, nA and nB, the common voting cost c, and the
communication protocol. The last factor is especially important, because communication allows
voters’ actions to be correlated, which can, in theory, lead to higher turnout than predicted by the
standard Nash equilibria.
The above considerations led us to implement the following 2×2×3 design: large minority (nA = 6,
nB = 4) vs. small minority (nA = 7, nB = 3); high cost (c = 0.3) vs. low cost (c = 0.1); and
three communication treatments. With respect to communication, the three treatments were: No
Communication (NC); Public Communication (PC), where players communicate prior to playing
the turnout game by exchanging public messages visible to all participants; and Group-restricted
public communication (GC), where players can exchange messages that are visible only to other
members of their own group/party.
Table 1 summarises equilibria with maximal expected turnout. The table shows the maximum
expected turnout rates for quasi-symmetric Nash,11 correlated and subcorrelated equilibria, for
the four treatments in the party-size/voting-cost domain, as well as relevant related equilibrium
probabilities. We denote by TA (TB) the expected equilibrium turnout rate in party A (B); T is the
expected total turnout rate; Tie is the probability of a tie, Pivot is probability of a pivotal event
(defined as tie± one vote); Upset is the probability of the minority party winning (upset rate); and
Margin is the expected margin of victory for party A. It is defined as
Margin =
nATA − nBTB
nATA + nBTB
. (14)
Note that Pivot and Tie are total probabilities of the respective joint vote profiles rather than
individual-specific probabilities of a single vote making or breaking a tie. E.g., for the case of
11Given the anonymous random matching and the symmetric structure of the game for each party, we limit attention
to Nash equilibria in which all members of the party mix with the same probability. This is standard in the analysis
of data from turnout experiments: e.g., Schram and Sonnemans (1996a); Agranov et al. (2017). Other kinds of highly
asymmetric Nash equilibria are discussed in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983).
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nA = 7 and c = 0.1, these probabilities in the turnout-maximising SCE are slightly lower than in a
quasi-symmetric NE (cf. respective rows in Table 1). Despite this, the expected total turnout rate
is higher in the SCE. The reason is that in the SCE, individual turnout probabilities are correlated
within each party, so each individual faces potentially different (weaker) incentive constraints than
in NE.
Table 1: Theoretical Values for Equilibria with Maximal Total Expected Turnout
Nash Quasi-Symmetric
nA nB c TA TB T Tie Pivot Upset Margin
6 4 0.1 0.625 0.375 0.525 0.089 0.298 0.083 0.428
– – 0.3 0.161 0.253 0.198 0.322 0.781 0.518 −0.023
7 3 0.1 0.521 0.479 0.508 0.098 0.319 0.009 0.435
– – 0.3 0.147 0.380 0.217 0.310 0.773 0.545 −0.052
Subcorrelated Equilibria
nA nB c TA TB T Tie Pivot Upset Margin
6 4 0.1 0.667 1.000 0.800 0.200 0.636 0.365 0.000
– – 0.3 0.667 1.000 0.800 0.600 0.790 0.421 0.000
7 3 0.1 0.725 0.482 0.652 0.096 0.278 0.048 0.556
– – 0.3 0.544 0.799 0.620 0.479 0.691 0.240 0.227
Correlated Equilibria
nA nB c TA TB T Tie Pivot Upset Margin
6 4 0.1 0.667 1.000 0.800 0.200 0.636 0.365 0.000
– – 0.3 0.667 1.000 0.800 0.600 0.790 0.421 0.000
7 3 0.1 0.831 0.296 0.670 0.059 0.335 0.030 0.735
– – 0.3 0.591 0.716 0.628 0.429 0.764 0.215 0.317
Notes: There are other correlated equilibria with smaller total
turnout, and a low-turnout quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium that
is not listed here.
Table 1 shows several patterns of the theoretical equilibrium properties across treatments. We
emphasise those regarding the total turnout12 in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 1. In equilibria that maximise expected turnout under our parameters, the total
turnout rate is 1) weakly increasing with correlation in voters’ actions (from a Nash to a Subcorre-
lated to a Correlated equilibrium); 2) increasing in ex ante election competitiveness, except under
high voting cost in the quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium; and 3) weakly decreasing in the voting
cost.
12One should note that different solution concepts in Table 1 make equilibrium predictions at different levels:
quasi-symmetric NE pins down individual turnout probabilities, conditional on their party, SCE pins down party-
specific turnout rates (individual turnout probabilities within a party may be correlated), and CE pins down the total
turnout rate (individual turnout probabilities both within and across parties may be correlated. For nA = 6, both
SCE and CE achieve the same maximal expected total turnout, so party-restricted correlation in SCE has no bite).
Furthermore, there may be multiple equilibria with the same expected turnout. Therefore, we use total turnout rates
to make aggregate predictions that are comparable. To check consistency of the data with theory, we use frequency
distributions over joint vote profiles rather than a single summary statistic.
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3.2 Procedures
We ran a total of ten sessions with a high common cost (c = 0.3) and another ten sessions with
a low common cost (c = 0.1), with the main focus on the effects of communication. For each
cost, there were two sessions of no communication (NC) and four sessions each of the two com-
munication treatments: group communication (GC), and public communication (PC). We used a
within-subjects design for the relative size treatment in each session, and we recruited 20 subjects
per session to mitigate the effects of shared histories in the presence of communication. The same
communication mode (NC, GC, or PC) was used throughout the entire session. No subject partic-
ipated in more than one session. For communication treatments, we limited the duration of chat
to 110 seconds.13
Each session consisted of 20 “matches”, divided into two parts with 10 matches (which we’ll inter-
changeably refer to as rounds) in each part. In each match, players in the majority and the minority
group were asked to decide whether to abstain or to vote for their party’s candidate, knowing the
common voting cost. To avoid possible experimenter demand effects, no voting context was men-
tioned.14 Majority and minority parties were called “type A” and “type B,” respectively. Subjects
chose between two abstract options, X and Y , which corresponded to voting and abstention, re-
spectively. The voting cost was implemented as an opportunity cost (i.e., choosing option Y would
result in a bonus payoff equal to c). An example of the user interface is shown in Figure A.1 in
Appendix A. Sample instructions, which were read aloud by the experimenter, are in Appendix B.
Subjects were randomly assigned to parties and electorates according to the following algorithm.
At the beginning of part 1, all subjects were randomly assigned one of the two possible types, which
split the session participants into majority and minority pools. For example, if part 1 had relative
party sizes of (7, 3) and there were 20 subjects in the session, 14 of these subjects were randomly
selected to be in the majority pool, and the remaining 6 subjects were assigned to the minority pool.
Next, in the first match of part 1, two ten-voter electorates were created by randomly assigning
7 subjects from the majority pool and 3 subjects from the minority pool to form one of these
13When analysing chat logs, it was clear that this amount of time was more than enough for meaningful commu-
nication.
14Levine and Palfrey (2007) conducted experiments with both neutral and ”election” contexts and found no sig-
nificant difference in behaviour.
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electorates, with the remaining subjects forming the second electorate. This electorate assignment
step was carried out at the beginning of each of the ten matches of part 1 and was independent
across matches. Thus, for the ten matches of part 1, the assignment of subjects to the party pools
remained unchanged, but the assignment to one of the two ten-voter electorates was randomly
shuﬄed after every match. See Figure 1. At the beginning of part two, the subjects were informed
that relative party sizes were different. (In this example, the relative party sizes in part two would
be (6, 4).) Subjects were then randomly re-allocated into the two party pools in the following way.
All subjects from the former minority pool were assigned to the new majority party pool, with the
remaining members of the new majority party pool assigned randomly from the previous majority
pool. A former minority subject’s new assignment to a party pool was fixed throughout the 10
matches in part 2; a former majority subject’s new assignment to a party pool was determined
randomly at the beginning of each match.
Subjects	=	{𝟏,𝟐, 𝟑,… ,𝟐𝟎}𝐴*, 𝐴+, … , 𝐴*,	𝐵*, 𝐵+,… , 𝐵/ 𝐴*,𝐴+,𝐴0,𝐴,, 𝐴1,𝐴/, 𝐴2 𝐴3,𝐴4, 𝐴*5,𝐴**, 𝐴*+,𝐴*0, 𝐴*,𝐵*,𝐵+,𝐵0 𝐵,,𝐵1,𝐵/
𝐴*6 , 𝐴+6 , 𝐴06 ,𝐴,6 , 𝐴16 ,𝐴/6 , 𝐴26 𝐴36 , 𝐴46 , 𝐴*56 ,𝐴**6 , 𝐴*+6 ,𝐴*06 , 𝐴*,6𝐵*6, 𝐵+6 , 𝐵06 𝐵,6, 𝐵16 , 𝐵/6
Match 2
Same 
people
Same 
people
Match 1
Different 
people
Different 
people
Figure 1: Assignment to parties and electorates in Part 1 (example for (7,3) size treatment): 20
subjects are first randomly assigned into a majority pool of 14 and minority pool of 6 members; each
subsequent match each pool is randomly split into two 10-person electorates comprising 7 members
from A and 3 members from B.
We chose this scheme to mitigate the inherent inequality of payoffs across subjects since, in ei-
ther size treatment, the majority was more likely to win.15 Subjects’ IDs within their party were
randomly re-assigned every round. In communication treatments, each message contained informa-
tion about the sender’s ID and party, so public messages from different subjects could be clearly
distinguished.
15We encountered a minor software issue once when switching to part 2 in two sessions ((7,3)(6,4), high cost, and
either PC or GC). The resulting session protocol violation was that not all of the minority voters in part 1 might
have been switched to the majority in part 2. There were no other violations, and we do not view this as an issue
for the analysis.
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We did not inform subjects about the number of matches in each part. Instructions for part 2
were delivered after part 1 concluded. Two rounds from each part were randomly selected and
the subjects paid, so the payoff of each subject was the sum of payoffs in four rounds plus the
show-up fee of $7. Overall, the 20-session, 2 × 2 × 3 design used 400 subjects, which generated a
dataset with a total of 800 elections. The average payoff per subject was $28.99. Sessions with
communication lasted approximately 1.5 hours, and sessions without communication took a bit less
than one hour.16
Table 2 summarises our design and experimental parameters.
Table 2: Session Summary
Communication Session Cost c = 0.1 Session Cost c = 0.3
First 10 rounds Last 10 rounds First 10 rounds Last 10 rounds
Group Chat 1 (6,4) (7,3) 2 (6,4) (7,3)
3 (7,3) (6,4) 4 (7,3) (6,4)
5 (6,4) (7,3) 6 (6,4) (7,3)
7 (7,3) (6,4) 8 (7,3) (6,4)
Public Chat 9 (6,4) (7,3) 10 (6,4) (7,3)
11 (7,3) (6,4) 12 (7,3) (6,4)
13 (6,4) (7,3) 14 (6,4) (7,3)
15 (7,3) (6,4) 16 (7,3) (6,4)
No Chat 17 (6,4) (7,3) 18 (6,4) (7,3)
19 (7,3) (6,4) 20 (7,3) (6,4)
Notes: Each row represents two sessions. Table cells contain the sizes of (Majority, Minority) for each
treatment. For each communication regime and voting cost, each session combined two size treatments and
had 20 rounds total, with two independent electorates in each round.
4 Results
For each treatment, Figure 2 presents the averages of turnout rates in each party and the total
turnout rate.17 The corresponding numerical values are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A. With
our 2×2×3 design and 20 sessions, the total number of elections was 40 in each NC treatment and
80 in each GC and PC treatment. To account for possible correlation across rounds and across ten-
person groups (as group composition changed after every round), we treated each group over ten
rounds as a panel, and computed panel-corrected standard errors with a correction for first-order
16All sessions were conducted at the UC-Irvine Experimental Social Science Laboratory (ESSL). The computer
software was developed using the Multistage framework (http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu).
17For expositional clarity, for many of our results, we report additional supporting figures and estimation details
(e.g., standard errors and p-values) in Appendix A.
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autocorrelation within each panel.18 Figure 2 shows a number of differences across treatments,
which we discuss and test below.
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Figure 2: Average Turnout Rates.
A quick comparison with the theoretic predictions for max-turnout equilibria in Table 1 shows that
Nash equilibrium is not very consistent with the behaviour observed in our experiment: average
total turnouts rates in the data are much higher (with one exception) than in the maximal turnout
Nash equilibria predictions of Table 1, already in the NC treatment, and even more so in the
18We also ran the standard two-sample t-test for comparison of means across treatments, which assumes inde-
pendent observations in each sample, and found very similar results. Clustering by subject also produced similar
outcomes. The findings we report in Figure 2 and Table A.1 are more conservative.
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GC treatment. Similar to the stylised facts from real-world elections and many past experimental
findings, voters in the lab tend to over-vote compared to the Nash equilibrium.
In contrast, a casual inspection of the turnout rates suggests that the data might be consistent with
correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium predictions, although to establish this more rigorously
requires a deeper analysis, which we present below in Section 4.5.
Total turnout rates in Figure 2 are somewhat lower than the max-turnout correlated and subcor-
related equilibrium predictions in Table 1, but they seem to satisfy the constraint of the turnout
upper bound. Thus, it might be possible to associate correlated and subcorrelated equilibria with
expected turnout that would match the data. In order to check this, we develop and apply a formal
direct test for consistency with correlated and subcorrelated equilibria in Section 4.5.2.
Figures A.2 – A.3 in Appendix A provide a more-detailed presentation of voting patterns in the
majority and minority parties. There, we also estimate individual voting probabilities for each
subject, and group them by treatment and session to assess between-session variability (see Figures
A.4 and A.5 in Appendix A).
The remainder of this section is organised as follows. In Sections 4.1–4.3, we statistically test
the treatment effects of changes in communication protocol, voting cost, and relative party sizes.
These behavioural effects are tested for using group-level decisions and do not rely on specific
assumptions about equilibrium behaviour. In Section 4.4 we check robustness of test results to
multiple hypothesis and learning using regression analyses. In Section 4.5, we look at voting profile
frequencies and check whether these patterns are consistent with equilibrium behaviour. In Section
4.6, we focus on communication treatments and report the analysis of the chat logs.
4.1 Effects of Communication on Turnout
We start our analysis by looking at the main effect of interest: how communication affects turnout.
RESULT 1. (Total Turnout) Group communication increases total turnout. Public communica-
tion decreases turnout under low cost, and has no effect under high cost.
Support. To test for the effect of communication on total (and party) turnout, we compared the
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average turnout rates under two different communication modes, while keeping party sizes and
voting cost fixed.19
Table 3: Effects of Communication on Turnout and Victory Margin
Group Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
6 4 0.1 0.274∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗
– – 0.3 0.244∗∗∗ 0.018 0.154∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
7 3 0.1 0.208∗∗∗ 0.060 0.160∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.118
– – 0.3 0.150∗∗∗ −0.094 0.076∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗
Public Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
6 4 0.1 −0.108∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.124∗
– – 0.3 0.076 −0.004 0.044 0.085∗ 0.172∗∗∗
7 3 0.1 −0.034 −0.196∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.143
– – 0.3 0.066∗ −0.091 0.018 0.153∗∗ 0.257∗∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
From Table 3, we see that, for each treatment, GC increases total turnout, compared to NC.
By contrast, the effect of PC is quite mixed. With high cost, PC has no significant effect on
total turnout. On the other hand, PC decreases turnout significantly with low cost for both size
treatments. 
RESULT 2. (Party Turnout) Communication affects party turnout differently for the majority
and minority parties: in all cases, communication increases (decreases) turnout more (less) for
the majority party than for the minority party. Thus, communication always increases the ex-
pected margin of victory for the majority party. With group communication, it uniformly increases
majority turnout and has either no effect or a negative effect on minority turnout. With public
communication and low cost, it decreases turnout by minority, with a smaller in magnitude, or no
effect on majority; with high cost, there are no significant effects.
Support. Looking at the party turnout rates in Table 3, we see that GC increases majority turnout
for each treatment, compared with NC. PC increases majority party turnout for large majority size
and high cost, but decreases majority turnout under low cost (the decrease is not significant for
the large majority treatment).
The effect of communication on minority turnout is less pronounced. GC decreases minority
turnout, compared to NC for the large minority and low cost. PC decreases minority turnout,
19We report two-sided p-values in Table A.3 in Appendix A.
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compared to NC for low cost, decreases for high cost are not significant.
The next-to-last column of Table 3 shows the difference between the marginal effect of communi-
cation on majority turnout compared to its effect on minority turnout. In all cases, ∆TˆA−∆TˆB is
positive and statistically significant. Because nA > nB, this implies immediately that communica-
tion increases the expected margin of victory for the majority party.20 The increase is significant
in all treatments except for the low cost, small minority. See the last column of Table 3. 
Next, we look at the effects of communication on several electoral characteristics: probability of
ties, pivotal events, and upsets.
RESULT 3. (Pivotal Events and Upsets) Communication nearly uniformly decreases probabil-
ities of ties and pivotal events, and significantly so for pivotal events under group communication
(all except for low cost and small minority), as well as one case of public communication with high
cost and large minority. Communication nearly uniformly decreases the probabilities of upsets, with
significant effects in half of the group communication treatments.
Support. We report the corresponding results in Table 4.
Table 4: Effects of Communication on Electoral Characteristics
Group Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivot ∆Upset
6 4 0.1 −0.256∗∗∗ −0.312∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗
– – 0.3 −0.133 −0.214∗∗∗ −0.045
7 3 0.1 −0.082 −0.079 −0.064
– – 0.3 −0.139 −0.199∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗
Public Communication minus No Communication
nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivot ∆Upset
6 4 0.1 −0.072 0.022 −0.047
– – 0.3 −0.080 −0.126∗ 0.065
7 3 0.1 −0.004 −0.012 −0.033
– – 0.3 −0.077 −0.083 −0.094
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
From Table 4, we find that communication nearly always decreases probabilities of ties, pivotal
events, and upsets. Out of 24 comparisons, 22 have a negative sign. The effect is generally stronger
for GC, and in all 12 GC vs. NC comparisons, the effect is negative. However, these differences
are significant in less than half the cases. The reason that these differences are generally negative
follows almost directly from the earlier observation that communication (either GC or PC) always
20The expected margin of victory is defined in (14).
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increases majority turnout by more than it increases minority turnout, leading to wider margins of
victory for the majority and fewer close elections. 
4.2 Effects of Changing the Voting Cost
Intuitively, increasing the voting cost should lead to a lower expected turnout. However, the
equilibrium effect is ambiguous for a few reasons. First, even without communication, there are
symmetric equilibria in which turnout is increasing in the cost;21 and communication expands the
set of equilibria relative to Nash, allowing for a wider range of expected turnout relative to the
no-communication equilibrium. Second, communication allows voters to coordinate their actions,
so it is possible that with communication, they might coordinate on a higher turnout equilibrium
with high voting costs than with low voting costs.
RESULT 4. (Cost Effect) Increasing the voting cost reduces the total turnout for each size and
communication treatment, except public. In two out of these four treatments, these effects are driven
by uniform changes in both parties’ turnout rates; in the remaining two, they are driven by changes
in one party’s turnout only. Increasing the voting cost nearly uniformly increases the probability of
pivotal events, with significant effects under group communication and large minority, and under
no communication and small minority.
Support. We first look at the effect of increasing the voting cost on turnout (Table 5), and then
report the effects on the electoral characteristics (Table 6).
Table 5: Effects of Cost on Turnout
High Cost minus Low Cost
nA nB Communication mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
6 4 NC −0.196∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
– – GC −0.226∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.127∗∗∗
– – PC −0.012 0.020 0.001
7 3 NC −0.107∗∗∗ −0.027 −0.081∗∗
– – GC −0.165∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗
– – PC −0.007 0.078∗∗ 0.019
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
21This may sound counter-intuitive. However, as Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, p.42) note, for voters to be indifferent
between voting and abstaining in a mixed Nash equilibrium, voting cost must equal their (endogenous) pivotal
probability. In the high turnout symmetric equilibrium (with equal-sized parties), as the cost increases, so does their
pivotal probability and, correspondingly, total turnout. See also No¨ldeke and Pen˜a (2016).
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From Table 5, we see that reducing the voting cost increases total turnout for each size and commu-
nication treatment, except for PC. Breaking down the total turnout by parties, we see that these
changes usually produce similar effects on party turnouts, except for GC with large minority, and
NC with small minority, where the majority is affected more, and PC with small minority, where
the minority is affected more.
Table 6 presents the corresponding effects of the cost change on the electoral characteristics con-
sidered earlier: the probability of ties, pivotal events, and upsets.
Table 6: Effects of Cost on Electoral Characteristics
High Cost minus Low Cost
nA nB Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
6 4 NC −0.067 0.127 −0.055
– – GC 0.056 0.225∗∗∗ 0.132
– – PC −0.075 −0.022 0.057
7 3 NC 0.126 0.200∗∗ 0.108
– – GC 0.068 0.080 0.044
– – PC 0.053 0.129 0.047
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
From Table 6, we see that reducing the voting cost does not significantly affect the probability of
ties. Reducing the cost decreases the probability of pivotal events under GC with large minority
and under NC with small minority. The probability of upsets is nearly uniformly increasing in the
cost (except for NC and large minority), but the changes are not significant. 
4.3 Effects of Changing the Relative Party Sizes
We now turn to the effects of changing the party sizes while keeping the electorate size fixed.
Intuitively, when the minority party is closer to 50%, a competition effect should lead to higher
turnout in both parties. That is, the competition effect hypothesis is that turnout in each party is
decreasing in nA − nB. Thus, increasing the minority party size from 3 to 4 at the expense of the
majority party should increase turnout in each party. However, theoretically, this is not always the
case with the highest turnout equilibrium: a more competitive election, ex ante, does not necessarily
lead to higher equilibrium overall turnout. Furthermore, the effect of election competitiveness can
be different for the majority and minority parties. Table 1 shows that in the high turnout, quasi-
symmetric Nash equilibrium, the majority party turnout is higher in more-competitive elections,
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but minority turnout is actually depressed, and the theoretical effect of competitiveness on overall
turnout can go either way; for our experimental parameters, the effect of competitiveness on overall
turnout is positive if cost is low, but negative if cost is high. In both correlated and subcorrelated
highest turnout equilibria, the effect of competitiveness on overall turnout and on minority turnout
is positive, as intuitively expected. However, for the majority party, there is an interaction between
cost and competitiveness. With high cost, the effect of competitiveness on TA is positive, as
expected, but with low cost, it goes the other way.
In contrast to the rather ambiguous theoretical implications about the competition effect, the data
from the experiment speak quite clearly. In nearly all comparisons, there is a significant competition
effect.
RESULT 5. (Competition Effect) Increasing competitiveness increases total turnout, majority
party turnout, and minority party turnout.
Support. The effects on turnout are reported in Table 7. The competition effect on total turnout
is positive and significant in all cases but one in which it is not significant. The competition effect
on majority party turnout is positive in all cases and significant in five out of six cases. The
competition effect on minority party turnout is positive and significant in four out of six cases
and is insignificant in the remaining two. Overall, the effects are not particularly consistent with
the high-turnout equilibrium effects of competitiveness in Table 1, as the theoretical sign of the
competition effect depends on the cost of voting, and can go in different directions for different
parties. With a high voting cost, six out of nine differences are significant and have the same sign
as the theoretical effect in Table 1. The remaining three differences are not significant. However,
with a low voting cost, half of the differences are significant with the opposite sign.
Table 7: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Turnout
Minority Size 4 minus Minority Size 3
c Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
0.1 NC 0.156∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
– GC 0.222∗∗∗ −0.076 0.088∗∗
– PC 0.082∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
0.3 NC 0.067∗ 0.021 0.049
– GC 0.161∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
– PC 0.076 0.108∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
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While we observe strong competition effects on turnout, there are few significant effects on the
probability of ties, pivotal events, and upsets.22 
4.4 Robustness of Treatment Effects
In this section, we discuss two potential concerns about the aggregate treatment effects reported in
Sections 4.1–4.3. First, pairwise comparisons may suffer from multiple hypothesis testing problems
and require type I error correction. Second, aggregate results may mask subject learning over time.
In order to partially alleviate both of these concerns, we ran several regression analyses for each
party and total turnout, as well as the margin of majority victory. Table 8 reports the results for
Logit (columns 1–3) and Tobit (column 4) specifications. The dependent variable is the binary
decision to vote (except for column 4, in which it is the normalised margin).23 The regressors are
treatment dummies and their interactions.24 The standard errors are clustered at the group-round
level. To account for potential learning over time, we included an early round dummy variable
taking value of 1 for rounds 1–5 and value of 0 for rounds 6–10 of each treatment.
The regression analysis results are consistent across treatments. First, we found no evidence of
learning: none of the early rounds dummies was significant on their own or as part of any interaction
terms.25
Second, as Table 8 shows, the main results in Sections 4.1–4.3 follow through: Group commu-
nication increases total turnout. Public communication decreases total turnout with low cost as
the interaction terms Comm × Cost indicate. Increasing voting cost reduces everyone’s turnout.
Increasing minority size (i.e., competitiveness) increases turnout but the effect is only significant
in interactions with cost. Group communication increases the majority victory margin, although
there is a negative effect when interacted with size and voting cost.
22See Table A.8 in Appendix A.
23The regression in column 4 uses a Tobit specification with bounds −1 and 1.
24We also carried out regressions with vote shares (i.e., turnout rates) as dependent variables, for Tobit and OLS
specifications. The results are qualitatively similar.
25To avoid clutter, the regression estimates of the early rounds dummies and their interactions are omitted in Table
8.
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Table 8: Regressing Party and Total Turnout on Treatment Dummies
TA TB T Margin
Const −0.475∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗ −0.468∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.229) (0.174) (0.150) (0.139)
Comm GC 1.004∗∗∗ 0.052 0.619∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗
(0.311) (0.311) (0.237) (0.168)
PC 0.442 0.000 0.268 0.272
(0.286) (0.295) (0.202) (0.175)
Size nA = 7 −0.175 −0.161 −0.172 0.290
(0.322) (0.332) (0.250) (0.218)
Comm × Size GC, nA = 7 −0.425 −0.403 −0.300 −0.019
(0.408) (0.504) (0.334) (0.254)
PC, nA = 7 −0.287 −0.228 −0.224 −0.052
(0.400) (0.486) (0.320) (0.266)
Cost c = 0.1 0.916∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.102
(0.327) (0.312) (0.216) (0.175)
Comm × Cost GC, c = 0.1 0.323 −1.188∗∗ −0.458 0.253
(0.428) (0.510) (0.311) (0.222)
PC, c = 0.1 −0.766∗ −1.108∗∗∗ −0.895∗∗∗ −0.075
(0.412) (0.433) (0.285) (0.229)
Size × Cost nA = 7, c = 0.1 −0.553 −0.791 −0.617∗ 0.078
(0.423) (0.499) (0.320) (0.267)
Comm × Size × Cost GC, nA = 7, c = 0.1 −0.134 2.286∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗ −0.603∗
(0.537) (0.757) (0.427) (0.328)
PC, nA = 7, c = 0.1 0.341 0.389 0.415 0.092
(0.535) (0.680) (0.416) (0.339)
Notes. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the
group-round level N = 800. Comm refers to communication mode. Size refers to majority size. In Column 2,
the controls are as follows. GC (group communication) and PC (public communication) are relative to NC
(no communication). nA = 7 is relative to nA = 6. c = 0.1 is relative to c = 0.3. All specifications include a
dummy for early rounds as well as all its interactions.
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4.5 Correlated Equilibrium Analysis and Tests
In this section, we investigate whether adding communication results in a “higher” correlation in
voters’ choices, and whether the data are consistent with correlated and subcorrelated equilib-
ria. We start by making additional assumptions necessary for the tests and formulating the test
hypotheses.
Assumptions and Hypotheses
For the analysis of correlation in the data, we need to apply Assumption 1, which reduces the
number of possible profiles to a total of (nA + 1)(nB + 1) different profiles – i.e., 32 and 35 profiles
in the small minority (7, 3) and large minority (6, 4) treatments, respectively, for which frequencies
can be estimated from the data. Furthermore, this assumption is also plausible to hold in our data,
since player IDs within each party are randomly reassigned every round. In addition to Assumption
1, we need to assume that the joint probability distribution is fixed throughout the game to ensure
consistency of the frequency estimates.
ASSUMPTION 2. (Fixed distribution) The realised voting outcomes are drawn every round from
the same joint probability distribution (not necessarily an equilibrium one).
Next, we formalise and test the following three hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 1. (Independent Voting Decisions) Each voter votes independently with the same
probability conditional on her party.
HYPOTHESIS 2. (Quasi-symmetric Nash) With NC, individual voting probabilities of the majority
and minority party members, q∗A and q
∗
B, respectively, are determined by a quasi-symmetric Nash
equilibrium.
HYPOTHESIS 3. (Correlated and Subcorrelated Equilibria) a) With PC, the vote distribution is
consistent with a correlated equilibrium; b) With GC, the distribution is consistent with a subcor-
related equilibrium.
Hypotheses 1 – 3 inform us about important properties of voting behaviour with and without
communication. If Hypothesis 1 holds, voting strategies can be described by two probabilities,
qA and qB, for voters in the majority and minority party, respectively. Notice that Hypothesis 1
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simultaneously requires independence and equal voting probabilities across voters within the same
party, so, in principle, it can be rejected due to a violation of either property. But since Assumption
1 implies symmetry among all players in a party, we focus on testing for independence only. Thus,
if we find that Hypothesis 1 does not hold, we interpret this as evidence for correlated voting. So,
if Hypothesis 1 holds with no communication but is rejected with communication, this implies that
communication introduces correlation. Moreover, this would immediately imply that the voting
data with communication are not consistent with Nash equilibrium play.
If Hypothesis 2 holds, the two voting probabilities under NC are pinned down by the equilibrium
conditions on qA and qB in (3) and (4). If Hypothesis 3 holds, then our simple communication
protocols can effectively imitate a complex correlating device required for correlated and subcorre-
lated equilibrium implementation (in some correlated equilibria, private communication via some
form of mediated communication would be required). If Hypothesis 3 is rejected, this could be due
to voters not playing a group-symmetric correlated/subcorrelated equilibrium (e.g., because of be-
ing boundedly rational or having social preferences) or, perhaps, because mediated communication
protocols are needed to implement the equilibrium correlating device.
4.5.1 Correlation in voting decisions
In this section, we investigate Hypotheses 1 and 2. The findings are summarised by
RESULT 6. (Independence and Correlation) Without communication, voters’ turnout deci-
sions are independent. Quasi-symmetric Nash is rejected under the high voting cost but not under
the low voting cost and large minority. Introducing communication results in correlated turnout
decisions in seven out of eight treatments, with no support for Nash equilibrium play.
Support. First, we check Hypothesis 1. We employ two different tests to compare the probability
distribution of joint voting profiles estimated from the data with the induced distribution under
the null: Likelihood Ratio and Epps-Singleton, the latter being a more powerful non-parametric
alternative to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for comparing discrete distributions (see Appendix A.1
for test details).
Table 9 shows that in all NC treatments, none of these tests rejects Hypothesis 1 (independent
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voting) at the 0.05 level. Hypothesis 1 is rejected by the Likelihood Ratio test for all communication
treatments (except PC under low cost), as well as by the Epps-Singleton test under high voting
cost for both PC and GC, and under low cost for PC. Thus, both the Likelihood Ratio and
Epps-Singleton tests produce relatively consistent results. Since Epps-Singleton does not take into
account the variance in the estimation of qˆA and qˆB, we are more confident in the Likelihood Ratio
test when interpreting our results under communication.
Table 9: Test for Symmetric Independent Voting: Estimated vs. Induced Distributions
Communication nA nB c ES test LR test
W2 p-val LR χ
2
0.05
NC 6 4 0.1 1.173 0.883 35.780 46.194 (32)
– – – 0.3 0.962 0.916 35.631 –
GC – – 0.1 5.381 0.250 215.444∗∗∗ –
– – – 0.3 19.339∗∗∗ 0.001 170.422∗∗∗ –
PC – – 0.1 12.715∗∗ 0.013 66.029∗∗∗ –
– – – 0.3 11.830∗∗ 0.019 112.384∗∗∗ –
NC 7 3 0.1 4.636 0.327 16.694 42.557 (29)
– – – 0.3 3.979 0.409 30.330 –
GC – – 0.1 3.981 0.409 168.517∗∗∗ –
– – – 0.3 12.202∗∗ 0.016 95.288∗∗∗ –
PC – – 0.1 0.815 0.936 22.522 –
– – – 0.3 11.037∗∗ 0.026 73.897∗∗∗ –
Notes: W2 is the two-sample Epps-Singleton test statistic for discrete data, computed
using a modified version of the external Stata routine escftest. LR is the likelihood ratio,
corresponding χ20.05 critical value with (nA + 1)(nB + 1)− 3 degrees of freedom (either 32
or 29). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
In the NC treatments, we focus on testing Hypothesis 2 for the max turnout quasi-symmetric
Nash equilibrium because the summary data statistics indicate very high turnout rates that are
inconsistent with the low-turnout, quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium.26 The results of the Epps-
Singleton test are reported in Table 10. We reject Hypothesis 2 under high cost (and, marginally,
under low cost and small minority), but not under low cost and large minority. Thus, in the low-
cost NC treatments, the data are roughly consistent with a max-turnout quasi-symmetric Nash
equilibrium. For communication treatments, we find that voting decisions are correlated, so there
is no consistency with Nash equilibrium.27

26See Table A.1 in Appendix A.
27As an extra check, we tested and rejected Nash under all communication treatments.
29
Table 10: Test for Max-Turnout Quasi-Symmetric Nash under NC
nA nB c ES test
W2 p-val
6 4 0.1 2.752 0.600
– – 0.3 48.595∗∗∗ 0.000
7 3 0.1 7.830∗ 0.098
– – 0.3 26.193∗∗∗ 0.000
Notes: W2 is the two-sample Epps-Singleton test statistic
for discrete data, computed using a modified version of the
external Stata routine escftest. The null hypothesis is that
the equilibrium distribution and the estimated distribution
are the same. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05,
∗ < 0.1
4.5.2 Consistency with correlated and subcorrelated equilibria
Having estimated the frequencies of all joint voting profiles, we can now test whether the realised
vote distribution forms a correlated or a subcorrelated equilibrium.
The technical details of the tests for Hypothesis 3 are in Appendix A.2. The main idea is to
compare the estimated probabilities of the joint profiles µˆa,b for each pair of vote counts (a, b) with
the induced probabilities µ˜a,b under the null of the respective Hypothesis. We compare the two
distributions by means of a two-sample Epps-Singleton test.
RESULT 7. (Correlated Equilibrium) Correlated and subcorrelated equilibria are both rejected
for all public communication treatments and most group communication treatments. We do not
reject correlated equilibrium under group communication and low cost. We also do not reject sub-
correlated equilibrium under group communication, low cost, and small minority.
Support. Table 11 presents the results of our test for constraint violations for all of our treatments.
Inconsistency with equilibrium (indicated by a test rejection) is generally due to the observation of
too low a frequency of pivotal events, conditional on voting.28
We find, however, that under the low cost and GC, we cannot reject the null of aggregate voting
behaviour being consistent with a correlated equilibrium (and marginally reject it for the large mi-
nority case). By contrast, we soundly reject the correlated equilibrium hypothesis in the remaining
28See Tables A.9 – A.12 in Appendix A. The results from Table 11 should be interpreted with caution, because
they are based on a relatively small number of observations, and because there are many possible profiles, so the data
are rather sparse.
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Table 11: Test for Consistency with Correlated Equilibrium
Communication nA nB c IU stat
GC 6 4 0.1 5.487∗
– – – 0.3 67.698∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 12.893∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 38.335∗∗∗
GC 7 3 0.1 1.364
– – – 0.3 91.712∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 15.938∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 44.282∗∗∗
IU test statistic is defined in (A.8) in Appendix A.2.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
treatments.29
Table 12 presents the results of our test for a subcorrelated equilibrium in the communication
treatments.30 The estimated group frequencies and equilibrium constraints are in Tables A.11 –
A.12 in Appendix A.2.
Table 12: Test for Consistency with Subcorrelated Equilibrium
Communication nA nB c IU stat
GC 6 4 0.1 16.429∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 213.204∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 17.462∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 95.414∗∗∗
GC 7 3 0.1 4.759
– – – 0.3 124.498∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 30.390∗∗∗
– – – 0.3 64.876∗∗∗
IU test statistic is defined in (A.8) in Appendix A.2.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
We see from Table 12 that the test results for subcorrelated equilibrium are broadly in line with
the results for correlated equilibrium, and that GC, low cost, and small minority remains the only
consistent treatment. 
4.6 Analysis of Chat Data in Communication Treatments
In this section, we take a deeper look at the actual communication between subjects. Our main
goals here are to try to understand how PC differs from GC and how the number of messages in
29Strictly speaking, this is a joint hypothesis of a correlated equilibrium and Assumptions 1–2.
30Because the set of subcorrelated equilibria is contained in the set of correlated equilibria, rejection of correlated
equilibrium implies rejection of subcorrelated equilibrium (and Nash equilibrium).
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different categories is related to turnout.
We recorded the messages that subjects exchanged during each pre-play communication stage and
employed an independent research assistant to classify and code the messages according to ten
general categories, listed in Table 13.
Table 13: Message Categories and Observed Aggregate Frequencies
Code Description Examples GC, % PC, %
0 Irrelevant “hello” 30.81 31.30
1 Disagreement “no!” 1.12 1.56
2 Agreement to a proposed joint strategy “alright” 7.43 3.71
3 General discussion about rules “you can only get 135 in type A” 23.22 19.26
4 Informative statement about history “one A chose Y last time” 7.19 5.16
5 Question to others: what are we going to do? “so X or Y?” 2.19 1.68
6 Strategy suggestion about others’/own/group decision “if you’re 1-4 pick x” 21.92 34.51
7 Own plan: will choose X “I’ll do X” 3.80 1.38
8 Own plan: will choose Y “I’ll do Y” 2.04 1.21
9 Ambiguous “not sure” 0.27 0.23
Total number of messages 13,109 14,015
We begin our analysis by looking at the message frequency distributions pooled across cost and
group size treatments.
RESULT 8. (Message Types) Public and group communication induce similar message frequen-
cies overall, but public communication treatments have more strategy suggestions and fewer agree-
ment and own plan messages than group communication treatments. About 31% of all messages
are irrelevant in both communication treatments.
Support. We compute message frequencies for each category listed in Table 13 and report them
in the last two columns of that table. We observe a large fraction of irrelevant messages (code
0: about 31% of the total of about 4,040 (about 4,400) messages under GC (PC).) Other high-
frequency categories of messages include strategy suggestions (code 6: about 22% of the total under
GC and about 35% under PC); and discussion about the rules of the game (code 3: about 23%
under GC and about 19% under PC.) The next two largest categories are messages expressing
agreement (code 2: about 7% under GC and about 4% under PC) and messages informative about
the history of play (code 4: about 7% under GC and about 5% under PC). A smaller fraction
of messages relate to questions to others and own plans (codes 5, 7, and 8, respectively.) The
remaining categories – disagreement and ambiguous messages – comprise, on average, less than
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1.7% of the total messages.31 
To assess how the number of messages in different categories affects turnout rates, we estimate
a simple linear relationship, regressing for each communication treatment the normalised total
turnout32 on the total number of messages in each code category.
RESULT 9. (Message Effects) Irrelevant messages have no effect on the normalised turnout
rate, despite their large share. Agreement messages increase normalised turnout (significantly with
group communication); and disagreement messages decrease normalised turnout (significantly with
public communication). Total turnout increases in the number of messages stating intent to vote
and decreases in the number of messages stating intent to abstain. Since intent messages are mostly
truthful, this effect is driven largely by voters’ own turnout rather than their influence on others.
Support. Table 14 reports estimates from an ordered probit model regressing the normalised total
turnout on the number of messages in each of the categories (with standard errors and p-values
reported in Table A.15 in Appendix A.) We also estimate the ordinary least squares model and
find very similar results.
Table 14: Effects of the Number of Messages on Normalised Total Turnout in Communication
Treatments
Communication Message Category
(Irrelev.) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Hist.) (Q&S) (Vote) (Abst.)
Group 0.008 0.028 0.085∗∗∗ 0.029 0.013∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
Public 0.003 −0.038∗∗∗ 0.025 −0.002 −0.001 0.333∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code ordered probit estimates of the effects of the total
number of messages per electorate in that category on the normalised total turnout. Significance
codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1. For clarity of presentation we combined messages with codes
0, 3, and 9 into the “Irrelevant” category. We also combined messages with codes 5 and 6 into the
“Q&S” category. The remaining message categories are as described in Table 13.
While the intent messages (the last two columns of Table 14) show significant effects, it could well
be the case that an increase (decrease) in total turnout is simply due to voters being truthful about
their plans. To see whether voters expressing the intent to vote or abstain actually carry out their
31See Tables A.13 – A.14 in Appendix A for a breakdown of message frequencies by treatment and round. Those
tables suggest that the patterns are not a by-product of pooling across rounds or treatments. One minor exception
is that we observe a somewhat increasing proportion of irrelevant messages over rounds, especially under PC.
32Normalised total turnout makes data from cost and size treatments suitable for pooling together by taking into
account deviations of individual observations from the treatment-specific averages. It is defined for each group-
round election i in treatment j ∈ {High cost, Low cost} × {Large minority, Small minority} × {Public, Group} as
tij =
Tij−T¯j
Nj
, where Tij is the total number of votes; T¯j is the average number of votes (mean turnout rate); and Nj
is the number of group-round observations.
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promises, we compute a “truth” rate, defined for each election (group-round observation) as the
ratio of truthful messages (i.e., a voter says that she’ll vote and does vote, or she says that she’ll
abstain and does abstain) to the total number of intent messages in that election (i.e., messages with
“vote” and “abstain” codes). The average truth rate (pooled across majority and cost treatments)
for GC is 0.869 (se = 0.014, p = 0.000), and for PC, it is 0.812 (se = 0.022, p = 0.000). Thus,
voters stating their intent are mostly truthful.
Estimating the effect of intent messages on others’ turnout is far from straightforward: in the same
chat, there could be several voters expressing the intent to turn out, or some expressing the intent
to turn out and others the intent to abstain, and excluding all those who state any intent would
conflate the effects. Our crude estimates (available upon request) show some effect of the intent
messages on turnout through influencing the turnout of others, but the bulk of the change is driven
by voters’ own turnout (or non-turnout in the case of abstention). 
5 Concluding Remarks
This is the first laboratory study to examine how unrestricted and party-restricted pre-election
communication among voters affects turnout, by creating correlation between voter turnout deci-
sions. The experiment investigated how changes in communication structure affect both turnout
and electoral outcomes under different conditions of the cost of voting and ex ante election com-
petitiveness.
There are a number of central findings of the experiment. The most important finding is that com-
munication unambiguously benefits the majority party by increasing its expected turnout margin.
This finding is robust to all the different treatment variations in the experiment. This result is
surprising in the sense that we are not aware of any existing theoretical model that would predict
this systematic finding, including the Nash equilibrium model and our related analysis of correlated
equilibrium of the turnout game.
Second, we develop and apply a test for the effect of communication on correlation. With no
communication, we find strong evidence of independence, but only limited support for symmetric
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mixed Nash equilibrium. With communication, individual voting decisions are correlated, but again
find only limited support for correlated equilibrium, and no support for Nash equilibrium. Overall,
the effects of communication on correlation, and hence on outcomes, are significant and comparable
in magnitude to the effects of changing the main exogenous parameters of the model, which have
traditionally been viewed as key driving variables that influence turnout – i.e., voting cost and the
competitiveness of the election.
Third, we observe an interaction effect between the form of communication and the voting cost in
terms of how these two factors influence overall turnout in elections. In particular, party-restricted
communication increases turnout for both cost levels. Unrestricted public communication decreases
turnout with a low voting cost and has no effect on turnout with a high voting cost. This has
potentially relevant policy implications, especially since get-out-the-vote campaigns are shifting
towards social media – reaching new levels of political communication – and since changes in
voting technology and election laws affect the cost of voting.
Fourth, for most treatments, we find evidence for both a cost effect (turnout decreases in the voting
cost) and a competition effect (turnout increases in the relative size of the minority).33
We wish to underscore the importance of developing rigorous theoretical models to explicitly take
communication possibilities into account. Correlated and Subcorrelated equilibria provide a useful
framework for this. Testing for these equilibria in our data is the first attempt to identify the gen-
eral principles behind communication-based coordination in competing groups using the correlated
equilibrium approach.
Finally, one wonders how the results from our laboratory-scale elections extend to larger electorates,
and how our correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium approach could be applied to model com-
munication with many voters. These two questions are not independent. For example, practical
limitations preclude efficient unmediated communication among all the members of large electorate.
In typical elections, communication to and between voters is partly coordinated and mediated by
33In addition to the turnout-related results, we also looked at the effects on welfare, which, in this model, highlights
the tradeoff between the probability the majority party wins, the voting cost, and the expected total turnout.
Reducing the voting cost or the relative minority size increases total welfare in all treatments. Communication
increases welfare under low voting cost, but decreases it under high voting cost, for partition (7,3). See Table A.1 in
Appendix A. More detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
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party leaders and activists, and the explosion of diverse social media networks induces unmediated
communication to take place within many smaller clusters of users. Our approach is compatible
with both of these features. In particular, mediated communication by leaders can make it even
easier rather than harder to coordinate voters by inducing correlation in their turnout decision,
and the existence of smaller clusters of groups who engage in unmediated communication via social
media is consistent with our theoretical approach of modelling group communication using subcor-
related equilibrium, only with a finer partition of the set of voters. In a broader sense, this suggests
that our findings about the turnout effects of group communication in the laboratory might have
useful insights for the larger aggregate levels.34 The partial success of this framework, especially
the surprising and robust finding about the differential effect of communication on majority and
minority parties, invites further study. While beyond the scope of the current paper, a very inter-
esting and challenging extension of this initial study would be to explore the effects of mediated
and unmediated communication in much larger laboratory elections.
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology
and
Department of Economics, University of Warwick
34In the field, there can also be additional factors at play, such as social pressure (DellaVigna et al., 2017) or
ethical voting considerations (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006). We do observe some evidence
of social pressure in the chat logs, but do not find evidence of ethical voting behaviour.
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Appendix A Additional Details (for online publication)
The figures and tables in this appendix present additional estimation details for results in Section
4.
Figure A.1: User Interface (NC Treatment)
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Table A.1: Mean Turnout and Group Welfare Rates By Treatment
NC
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ Wˆ
40 6 4 0.1 0.600 (0.030) 0.574 (0.040) 0.587 (0.032) 0.489 (0.009)
– – – 0.3 0.403 (0.020) 0.371 (0.018) 0.390 (0.014) 0.442 (0.010)
– 7 3 0.1 0.443 (0.021) 0.377 (0.044) 0.423 (0.015) 0.614 (0.026)
– – – 0.3 0.336 (0.033) 0.349 (0.059) 0.341 (0.029) 0.509 (0.015)
GC
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ Wˆ
80 6 4 0.1 0.873 (0.018) 0.361 (0.062) 0.670 (0.027) 0.526 (0.007)
– – – 0.3 0.647 (0.026) 0.389 (0.052) 0.544 (0.025) 0.408 (0.013)
– 7 3 0.1 0.651 (0.023) 0.436 (0.053) 0.582 (0.022) 0.620 (0.013)
– – – 0.3 0.486 (0.016) 0.255 (0.022) 0.417 (0.012) 0.536 (0.012)
PC
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ Wˆ
80 6 4 0.1 0.491 (0.033) 0.346 (0.030) 0.432 (0.013) 0.514 (0.006)
– – – 0.3 0.479 (0.043) 0.366 (0.030) 0.433 (0.029) 0.417 (0.009)
– 7 3 0.1 0.409 (0.033) 0.180 (0.022) 0.340 (0.020) 0.633 (0.018)
– – – 0.3 0.402 (0.019) 0.259 (0.025) 0.359 (0.012) 0.539 (0.014)
Notes: N is the number of group decision observations. Panel-corrected AR(1)-
corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Table A.2: Mean Frequencies by Treatment
NC
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
40 6 4 0.1 0.272 (0.044) 0.477 (0.086) 0.259 (0.049)
– – – 0.3 0.205 (0.068) 0.603 (0.052) 0.204 (0.058)
– 7 3 0.1 0.111 (0.182) 0.300 (0.085) 0.116 (0.084)
– – – 0.3 0.237 (0.086) 0.500 (0.035) 0.223 (0.046)
GC
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
80 6 4 0.1 0.016 (0.067) 0.165 (0.053) 0.027 (0.062)
– – – 0.3 0.072 (0.059) 0.390 (0.046) 0.159 (0.064)
– 7 3 0.1 0.029 (0.046) 0.221 (0.038) 0.052 (0.042)
– – – 0.3 0.097 (0.031) 0.301 (0.038) 0.096 (0.034)
PC
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
80 6 4 0.1 0.200 (0.051) 0.499 (0.092) 0.212 (0.031)
– – – 0.3 0.125 (0.048) 0.477 (0.052) 0.269 (0.035)
– 7 3 0.1 0.107 (0.089) 0.288 (0.065) 0.083 (0.056)
– – – 0.3 0.160 (0.042) 0.417 (0.049) 0.130 (0.035)
Notes: N is the number of group decision observations. Panel-
corrected AR(1)-corrected standard errors are in parentheses
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Table A.3: Effects of Communication on Turnout
GC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 0.274∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.214∗∗∗ (0.005) 0.083∗∗ (0.050) 0.490∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.447∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – 0.3 0.244∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.018 (0.743) 0.154∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.227∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.264∗∗∗ (0.001)
– 7 3 0.1 0.208∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.060 (0.390) 0.160∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.150∗∗ (0.043) 0.118 (0.105)
– – – 0.3 0.150∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.094 (0.142) 0.076∗∗ (0.020) 0.244∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.331∗∗∗ (0.001)
PC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ ∆TˆA −∆TˆB ∆Margin
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 −0.108∗∗ (0.016) −0.229∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.155∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.121∗ (0.078) 0.124∗ (0.086)
– – – 0.3 0.076 (0.115) −0.004 (0.899) 0.044 (0.180) 0.085∗ (0.077) 0.172∗∗∗ (0.007)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.034 (0.391) −0.196∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.082∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.162∗∗ (0.022) 0.143 (0.114)
– – – 0.3 0.066∗ (0.083) −0.091 (0.165) 0.018 (0.573) 0.153∗∗ (0.021) 0.257∗∗ (0.011)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
Table A.4: Effects of Communication on Electoral Characteristics
GC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 −0.256∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.312∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.231∗∗∗ (0.004)
– – – 0.3 −0.133 (0.142) −0.214∗∗∗ (0.003) −0.045 (0.602)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.082 (0.665) −0.079 (0.401) −0.064 (0.498)
– – – 0.3 −0.139 (0.134) −0.199∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.127∗∗ (0.028)
PC v. NC
N nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
80 v. 40 6 4 0.1 −0.072 (0.289) 0.022 (0.861) −0.047 (0.423)
– – – 0.3 −0.080 (0.340) −0.126∗ (0.088) 0.065 (0.338)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.004 (0.984) −0.012 (0.910) −0.033 (0.742)
– – – 0.3 −0.077 (0.427) −0.083 (0.170) −0.094 (0.107)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
Table A.5: Effects of Cost on Turnout
High Cost v. Low Cost
N nA nB Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 6 4 NC −0.196∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.204∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.197∗∗∗ (0.000)
80 – – GC −0.226∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.028 (0.730) −0.127∗∗∗ (0.001)
– – – PC −0.012 (0.823) 0.020 (0.634) 0.001 (0.971)
40 7 3 NC −0.107∗∗∗ (0.008) −0.027 (0.712) −0.081∗∗ (0.017)
80 – – GC −0.165∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.181∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.165∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – PC −0.007 (0.855) 0.078∗∗ (0.021) 0.019 (0.415)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
Table A.6: Effects of Cost on Electoral Characteristics
High Cost v. Low Cost
N nA nB Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 6 4 NC −0.067 (0.411) 0.127 (0.211) −0.055 (0.469)
80 – – GC 0.056 (0.533) 0.225∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.132 (0.141)
– – – PC −0.075 (0.291) −0.022 (0.838) 0.057 (0.227)
40 7 3 NC 0.126 (0.535) 0.200∗∗ (0.034) 0.108 (0.266)
80 – – GC 0.068 (0.217) 0.080 (0.142) 0.044 (0.416)
– – – PC 0.053 (0.590) 0.129 (0.116) 0.047 (0.478)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table A.7: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Turnout
Minority Size 4 v. Minority Size 3
N c Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 0.1 NC 0.156∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.000)
80 – GC 0.222∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.076 (0.355) 0.088∗∗ (0.011)
– – PC 0.082∗ (0.079) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.092∗∗∗ (0.000)
40 0.3 NC 0.067∗ (0.084) 0.021 (0.732) 0.049 (0.139)
80 – GC 0.161∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.134∗∗ (0.019) 0.126∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – PC 0.076 (0.108) 0.108∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.074∗∗ (0.021)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
Table A.8: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Electoral Characteristics
Minority Size 4 v. Minority Size 3
N c Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 0.1 NC 0.161 (0.396) 0.177 (0.147) 0.143 (0.147)
80 – GC −0.013 (0.874) −0.056 (0.389) −0.024 (0.748)
– – PC 0.093 (0.369) 0.211∗ (0.064) 0.130∗∗ (0.044)
40 0.3 NC −0.032 (0.773) 0.104 (0.104) −0.020 (0.791)
80 – GC −0.026 (0.703) 0.089 (0.139) 0.063 (0.384)
– – PC −0.035 (0.585) 0.060 (0.396) 0.140∗∗∗ (0.006)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Figure A.2: Voting Patterns for Majority Party.
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Figure A.3: Voting Patterns for Minority Party.
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Figure A.4: Individual Turnout Frequencies.
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Figure A.5: Individual Turnout Frequencies with Subjects Grouped by Treatment and Session (with
20 Subjects per Session). Sessions in which the same subject has two overlapping frequencies rep-
resent part 2 (last 10 rounds) of each session in Table 2.
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Appendix A.1 Tests for the presence of correlation
We test Hypothesis 1 as follows. First, estimate the probabilities of the joint profiles µa,b from
the data for each pair of vote counts (a, b), obtaining the estimated distribution µˆ. Next, estimate
independent and group-symmetric probability of a voter turning out in each party, pA and pB, from
the data as averages over individual subjects’ voting probabilities in each group (depicted in Figure
A.4 for all subjects in all treatments), obtaining pˆA and pˆB. Given these estimates, we compute
the induced group voting probabilities γ˜ and δ˜ by plugging in pˆA and pˆB into the formulas for the
probability of a majority group profile with a votes:
γ(a) =
(
nA
a
)
paA(1− pA)nA−a, (A.1)
and probability of a minority group profile with b votes
δ(b) =
(
nB
b
)
pbB(1− pB)nB−b, (A.2)
and compute the induced joint distribution under the null as µ˜a,b = γ˜(a)δ˜(b). Finally, we compare
the resulting distribution with the actual distribution (i.e., µ˜ with µˆ) by means of a two-sample
Epps-Singleton test, obtaining the W2 test statistic. Epps-Singleton is a powerful non-parametric
alternative to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests suited for comparing discrete
distributions. The caveat of this approach is that one needs to account for variance in the estimates
pˆA and pˆB when generating the induced distribution. Therefore we supplement the results of Epps-
Singleton test with a maximum likelihood ratio test (cf. Moreno and Wooders (1998, pp.57-58)).
Let na,b be the number of times vote count (a, b) was observed, and N =
∑nA
a=0
∑nB
b=0 na,b be the
total number of observations in a given treatment. The log-likelihood that a sample was generated
by a multinomial distribution µ can be written as
`(µ) = C +
nA∑
a=0
nB∑
b=0
na,b lnµa,b (A.3)
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where C is a normalisation constant. Under the null of Hypothesis 1, the log-likelihood is maximised
at
µˆ0a,b =
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(∑
a,b
a
nA
na,b
N
)a(
1−
∑
a,b
a
nA
na,b
N
)nA−a(∑
a,b
b
nB
na,b
N
)b(
1−
∑
a,b
b
nB
na,b
N
)nB−b
Under the alternative hypothesis of µ being an arbitrary multinomial distribution, the log-likelihood
is maximised at µˆ1a,b =
na,b
N . The null and the alternative have 2 and (nA+1)(nB +1)−1 degrees of
freedom, respectively. The likelihood ratio, −2 (`(µˆ0)− `(µˆ1)), is then asymptotically distributed
as χ2 with (nA + 1)(nB + 1)− 1− 2 degrees of freedom, so we can compare the LR statistic with
the χ2 critical value at 0.05 level.
To test Hypothesis 2, we plug in the Nash equilibrium probabilities in (A.1) and (A.2) (e.g., we
set pA and pB equal to TA and TB from Table 1, respectively) and again compare the predicted
distribution with the actual one using Epps-Singleton test.
Appendix A.2 Tests for consistency with correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium
Correlated Equilibrium. Rewrite conditions (9)–(12) as the following system of four inequalities,
two for players in NA, and two for players in NB, with respect to (nA + 1)(nB + 1) variables of the
form
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b:
φ0A ≡
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
−nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
 ≤ 0 (A.4)
φ1A ≡
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b−
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a+1
) ( nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
≤ 0 (A.5)
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and
φ0B ≡
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nB−1
a
)(
nB
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nB−1
a
)(
nB
a
) ( nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
)
− nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
b=0
(
nB−1
b
)(
nB
b
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nB−1
b
)(
nB
b
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
 ≤ 0 (A.6)
φ1B ≡
nA∑
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min{a−1,nB}∑
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≤ 0 (A.7)
Let φ = [φ0A, φ
1
A, φ
0
B, φ
1
B] be a 4 × 1 vector of the left hand sides of the incentive compatibility
constraints (A.4)–(A.7). Notice that we can write φ = Jµ, where J ∈ R4×(nA+1)(nB+1) is a
constant Jacobian matrix, and µ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA + 1} × {0, . . . , nB + 1}) is a group-symmetric
probability distribution over joint voting profiles. Then µ is a group-symmetric CE if and only if
φ ≤ 0.
We now apply the inequality-based testing procedure described in Wolak (1989). Define ν ≡ −φ =
−Jµ, and let νˆ be its estimate from the experimental data, obtained from K independent trials.
Given µ, interpreted as a multinomial distribution with K trials and (nA + 1)(nB + 1) outcomes,
and a (nA + 1)(nB + 1) × (nA + 1)(nB + 1) variance-covariance matrix Σ, we can derive by the
Delta method that νˆ
a∼ N(ν0,Ω) and Ω = JΣJ ′.
We want to test H0 : ν0 ≥ 0 vs.ν0 6≥ 0. Following Wolak (1989), we define the test statistic as
IU ≡ (νˆ − ν˜)′Ω−1(νˆ − ν˜), (A.8)
where
ν˜ ≡ arg min
ν≥0
(νˆ − ν)′Ω−1(νˆ − ν).
In our computations, we estimate νˆ = −Jµˆ, where µˆ is a vector of estimated joint frequencies from
K experimental trials, and replace Ω with its consistent estimate Ωˆ = JΣˆJ ′. Suppose the IU test
statistic computed from the data equals s, then Wolak (1989, Corollary 1) allows us to compute
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the p-value under the null hypothesis ν0 ≥ 0 as follows.
sup
ν0≥0
Prν,Ω[IU ≥ s] =
4∑
k=0
Pr(χ2k ≥ s)w(4, 4− k,Ω),
where Pr(χ2k ≥ s) denotes the probability that a χ2k random variable exceeds s, and w(4, 4− k,Ω)
is the probability that exactly 4− k out of 4 elements in ν˜ are strictly positive. These weights can
be computed by Monte Carlo simulations.35
Subcorrelated Equilibrium. In order to test the subcorrelated equilibrium hypothesis, we
slightly modify the moment inequality procedure using the fact that now νˆ = −J [δˆ ⊗ γˆ], where
δˆ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nB + 1}), γˆ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA + 1}) have sample covariance matrices Σˆ1 and Σˆ2,
respectively (each estimated as a covariance matrix of a corresponding multinomial distribution
over group profiles), and ⊗ stands for Kronecker product. Using the Delta method, we obtain that
νˆ
a∼ N(ν0,Ω) and
Ω = H
Σˆ1 0
0 Σˆ2
H ′,
where
H4×(nB+1+nA+1) =
[
J [I[nB+1] ⊗ γˆ] J [δˆ ⊗ I[nA+1]]
]
,
and I[x] is an identity matrix of size x × x. The rest of the testing procedure is the same: we
compute the IU test statistic and test the null of H0 : ν0 ≥ 0 vs.ν0 6≥ 0.
35For the case with up to 4 restrictions analytical expressions for the weights are available in Kudo (1963) and
Shapiro (1985).
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Table A.9: Joint Profile Frequencies and Test for Correlated Equilibrium, Partition (6, 4)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.025 0 0.050 0.025 0
1 0 0.025 0 0 0 1 0 0.050 0.025 0 0
2 0 0 0.075 0.050 0.025 2 0.025 0.225 0.125 0 0
3 0.025 0 0.050 0.175 0.025 3 0 0.100 0.150 0 0
4 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.050 0 4 0 0.075 0.075 0 0
5 0.025 0 0.025 0.125 0.025 5 0 0.025 0 0.025 0
6 0 0.025 0.025 0.025 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
φ0A 0.621 −0.311
φ1A −0.379 0.071
φ0B 0.263 −0.017
φ1B −0.613 0.223
IU stat 9.682∗∗, p = 0.014 24.747∗∗∗, p = 0.000
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0.038 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.025 0.013 0.013 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0.013 2 0.025 0.075 0 0.013 0.013
3 0 0 0 0 0.013 3 0.038 0.038 0.025 0 0.025
4 0.050 0.013 0.013 0 0.025 4 0.038 0.025 0.013 0.038 0.038
5 0.288 0.013 0.038 0.013 0.125 5 0.138 0.063 0.050 0.013 0.063
6 0.238 0 0.038 0.025 0.100 6 0.063 0.013 0 0.013 0.075
φ0A −0.054 −0.159
φ1A 0.269 0.403
φ0B −0.647 −0.387
φ1B 0.165 0.233
IU stat 5.487∗, p = 0.085 67.698∗∗∗, p = 0.000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0.025 0.025 0.025 0 0 0 0.013 0.038 0 0 0.025
1 0.050 0.050 0.025 0 0 1 0.075 0.013 0.025 0 0
2 0.025 0.050 0.063 0.038 0 2 0.038 0.100 0.063 0.075 0.025
3 0.063 0.125 0.050 0.038 0 3 0.063 0.063 0.013 0.025 0.013
4 0.025 0.013 0.063 0.063 0.025 4 0.075 0.025 0.038 0 0.013
5 0.025 0.038 0.013 0 0 5 0.025 0.025 0.013 0.025 0.013
6 0.038 0 0.050 0 0 6 0.038 0 0.013 0 0.038
φ0A 0.523 −0.197
φ1A −0.290 0.300
φ0B 0.503 −0.275
φ1B −0.372 0.105
IU stat 12.893∗∗∗, p = 0.003 38.335∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group Nj (see (A.4)–(A.7)). Correlated
equilibrium requires all IC constraints not to exceed zero. The sum of frequencies may exceed one
due to rounding. IU stat is defined in (A.8). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table A.10: Joint Profile Frequencies and Test for Correlated Equilibrium, Partition (7, 3)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.050 0.075 0.025 0
1 0 0 0.025 0 1 0.050 0.075 0 0
2 0.125 0.100 0.075 0.025 2 0.100 0.075 0.125 0
3 0.075 0.150 0.050 0.025 3 0.025 0.125 0.025 0
4 0.025 0.125 0.075 0 4 0.050 0.025 0.075 0.025
5 0.025 0.050 0.050 0 5 0.025 0 0 0.025
6 0 0 0 0 6 0 0.025 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
φ0A −0.021 −0.200
φ1A 0.032 0.169
φ0B −0.083 −0.233
φ1B −0.208 0.128
IU stat 0.065, p = 0.954 11.031∗∗∗, p = 0.008
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.013 0.013 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0.088 0.075 0.013 0
2 0.013 0 0 0.038 2 0.025 0.050 0.025 0.013
3 0.050 0.013 0 0.038 3 0.150 0.025 0.013 0
4 0.175 0.038 0.038 0.150 4 0.113 0.013 0.050 0.013
5 0.138 0 0.025 0.050 5 0.125 0 0.013 0.050
6 0.138 0 0 0.050 6 0.063 0.013 0.013 0.025
7 0 0 0.013 0.038 7 0.013 0 0 0
φ0A −0.111 −0.322
φ1A 0.139 0.392
φ0B −0.571 −0.440
φ1B 0.054 0.143
IU stat 1.364, p = 0.548 91.712∗∗∗, p = 0.000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0.025 0.013 0 0 0 0.063 0.013 0 0
1 0.050 0.088 0 0.013 1 0.088 0.038 0.013 0.013
2 0.138 0.075 0 0 2 0.163 0.088 0.050 0.013
3 0.150 0.125 0.038 0 3 0.088 0.025 0.013 0.013
4 0.075 0.050 0 0 4 0 0.075 0.038 0.025
5 0.075 0.038 0.013 0 5 0.025 0.038 0 0.013
6 0.025 0.013 0 0 6 0.075 0.025 0.013 0
7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
φ0A −0.029 −0.319
φ1A 0.123 0.261
φ0B 0.158 −0.318
φ1B 0.013 0.119
IU stat 15.938∗∗∗, p = 0.001 44.282∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group Nj (see (A.4)–
(A.7)). Correlated equilibrium requires all IC constraints not to exceed zero.
The sum of frequencies may exceed one due to rounding. IU stat is defined in
(A.8). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
54
Table A.11: Group Profile Frequencies and Test for SubCorrelated Equilibrium, Partition (6, 4)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.025 0 0.100 0 0.100 0 0.050
1 0.025 1 0.100 1 0.075 1 0.475
2 0.150 2 0.275 2 0.375 2 0.425
3 0.275 3 0.450 3 0.250 3 0.050
4 0.250 4 0.075 4 0.150 4 0
5 0.200 5 0.050
6 0.075 6 0
φ0A 0.419 −0.206
φ1A −0.496 0.098
φ0B 0.253 −0.120
φ1B −0.466 0.136
IU stat 11.657∗∗∗, p = 0.006 21.235∗∗∗, p = 0.000
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.575 0 0.063 0 0.350
1 0 1 0.025 1 0.050 1 0.263
2 0.013 2 0.088 2 0.125 2 0.100
3 0.013 3 0.038 3 0.125 3 0.075
4 0.100 4 0.275 4 0.150 4 0.213
5 0.475 5 0.325
6 0.400 6 0.163
φ0A −0.066 −0.193
φ1A 0.218 0.450
φ0B −0.635 −0.463
φ1B 0.192 0.237
IU stat 16.430∗∗∗, p = 0.001 213.204∗∗∗, p = 0.000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.075 0 0.250 0 0.075 0 0.325
1 0.125 1 0.300 1 0.113 1 0.263
2 0.175 2 0.288 2 0.300 2 0.163
3 0.275 3 0.138 3 0.175 3 0.125
4 0.188 4 0.025 4 0.150 4 0.125
5 0.075 5 0.100
6 0.088 6 0.088
φ0A 0.371 −0.240
φ1A −0.139 0.287
φ0B 0.337 −0.316
φ1B −0.234 0.147
IU stat 17.462∗∗∗, p = 0.000 95.414∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for
group Nj (see (A.4)–(A.7)). Subcorrelated equilibrium re-
quires all IC constraints not to exceed zero and also satisfy
group independence. The sum of frequencies may exceed
one due to rounding. IU stat is defined in (A.8). Signifi-
cance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table A.12: Group Profile Frequencies and Test for SubCorrelated Equilibrium, Partition (7, 3)
NC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.250 0 0.150 0 0.300
1 0.025 1 0.425 1 0.125 1 0.400
2 0.325 2 0.275 2 0.300 2 0.250
3 0.300 3 0.050 3 0.175 3 0.050
4 0.225 4 0.175
5 0.125 5 0.050
6 0 6 0.025
7 0 7 0
φ0A −0.062 −0.258
φ1A −0.135 0.176
φ0B 0.189 −0.258
φ1B −0.120 0.131
IU stat 1.268, p = 0.587 21.406∗∗∗, p = 0.000
GC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.513 0 0.025 0 0.575
1 0 1 0.050 1 0.175 1 0.188
2 0.050 2 0.075 2 0.113 2 0.138
3 0.100 3 0.363 3 0.188 3 0.100
4 0.400 4 0.188
5 0.213 5 0.188
6 0.188 6 0.113
7 0.050 7 0.013
φ0A −0.170 −0.350
φ1A 0.131 0.389
φ0B −0.544 −0.471
φ1B 0.145 0.139
IU stat 4.759, p = 0.123 124.498∗∗∗, p = 0.000
PC
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.038 0 0.538 0 0.075 0 0.500
1 0.150 1 0.400 1 0.150 1 0.300
2 0.213 2 0.050 2 0.313 2 0.125
3 0.313 3 0.013 3 0.138 3 0.075
4 0.125 4 0.138
5 0.125 5 0.075
6 0.038 6 0.113
7 0 7 0
φ0A −0.067 −0.327
φ1A 0.126 0.277
φ0B 0.210 −0.369
φ1B −0.039 0.100
IU stat 30.390∗∗∗, p = 0.000 64.876∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for
group Nj (see (A.4)–(A.7)). Subcorrelated equilibrium re-
quires all IC constraints not to exceed zero and also satisfy
group independence. The sum of frequencies may exceed
one due to rounding. IU stat is defined in (A.8). Signifi-
cance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Appendix A.3 Analysis of chat data
Table A.13: Message Frequencies by Round under GC
nA nB Cost Round N Message Code
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(Irr.) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Rules) (Hist.) (Q?) (Strat.) (Vote) (Abst.) (Amb.)
6 4 0.1 1 318 22.96 2.20 11.32 23.58 1.89 2.83 28.93 4.72 1.26 0.31
– – – 2 413 15.01 0.97 9.20 21.79 4.60 2.91 42.86 2.18 0.48 0.00
– – – 3 362 22.38 2.76 7.73 25.14 6.63 1.10 29.01 2.76 2.49 0.00
– – – 4 321 22.43 0.62 9.03 34.58 3.74 2.49 23.05 1.56 1.56 0.93
– – – 5 322 22.36 0.93 7.45 31.68 9.01 1.55 16.46 9.32 1.24 0.00
– – – 6 330 42.12 0.91 6.36 17.88 4.55 2.42 19.39 5.76 0.30 0.30
– – – 7 325 32.62 0.31 6.77 27.08 2.15 2.46 16.92 7.08 4.62 0.00
– – – 8 353 37.96 0.00 7.08 20.68 5.95 1.98 17.56 5.67 2.55 0.57
– – – 9 383 33.42 0.52 4.18 31.85 4.18 1.57 17.75 5.74 0.52 0.26
– – – 10 412 28.37 0.93 7.23 25.77 4.97 2.01 24.19 4.78 1.50 0.25
– – 0.3 1 276 25.72 2.17 17.03 22.10 2.17 4.71 20.29 4.71 0.72 0.36
– – – 2 281 17.79 1.42 11.39 24.91 6.41 5.69 24.20 3.20 4.63 0.36
– – – 3 296 27.70 1.35 11.49 22.97 4.05 4.39 21.62 2.03 4.39 0.00
– – – 4 287 31.01 2.09 11.15 23.00 6.27 2.09 19.16 1.74 3.14 0.35
– – – 5 253 20.95 4.35 7.11 28.85 5.14 1.58 23.32 3.16 5.14 0.40
– – – 6 289 22.15 1.73 10.03 27.34 9.69 1.04 22.49 3.46 1.73 0.35
– – – 7 303 32.67 1.65 3.63 24.42 7.26 1.32 24.09 3.63 1.32 0.00
– – – 8 269 36.06 1.49 6.69 13.75 9.67 1.12 24.91 3.72 2.60 0.00
– – – 9 305 36.72 1.64 6.56 21.97 5.25 1.97 20.33 2.30 3.28 0.00
– – – 10 288 44.44 0.69 7.64 14.24 10.76 2.08 17.71 1.39 1.04 0.00
7 3 0.1 1 357 31.37 0.84 13.73 23.25 1.12 2.24 19.89 4.48 3.08 0.00
– – – 2 366 28.96 1.09 8.20 22.40 3.28 1.91 25.68 3.83 3.28 1.37
– – – 3 329 30.09 0.00 13.37 22.19 10.03 3.34 16.72 1.82 2.13 0.30
– – – 4 331 36.56 0.60 9.67 22.36 6.95 1.51 18.13 2.42 1.81 0.00
– – – 5 403 34.00 0.25 5.46 16.13 7.69 0.74 30.77 3.23 1.74 0.00
– – – 6 328 29.27 0.61 4.88 29.27 8.54 0.91 17.99 6.71 1.52 0.30
– – – 7 362 32.60 2.21 6.91 21.82 11.88 0.83 19.06 3.87 0.83 0.00
– – – 8 352 30.11 0.57 8.24 24.72 10.51 2.56 17.05 3.41 2.27 0.57
– – – 9 353 40.51 1.13 5.38 11.05 14.73 1.13 23.80 1.70 0.57 0.00
– – – 10 384 32.55 1.04 4.95 26.56 8.33 3.12 19.01 3.91 0.00 0.52
– – 0.3 1 345 28.99 2.03 8.99 29.86 2.32 4.35 18.55 2.03 1.74 1.16
– – – 2 310 26.77 0.65 6.77 21.94 7.42 3.23 26.45 1.94 4.52 0.32
– – – 3 289 30.80 0.69 4.50 25.26 4.50 2.08 25.26 6.57 0.35 0.00
– – – 4 296 28.38 1.01 5.07 25.00 7.43 3.38 20.95 6.08 2.70 0.00
– – – 5 354 31.07 3.11 5.37 20.06 7.91 1.13 23.45 5.08 2.82 0.00
– – – 6 284 28.52 0.35 5.63 20.77 17.25 3.87 19.01 1.06 1.76 1.76
– – – 7 296 39.86 0.00 6.42 17.57 10.14 1.01 18.24 3.72 3.04 0.00
– – – 8 319 34.17 0.63 4.39 22.88 8.15 1.88 24.14 2.19 1.57 0.0
– – – 9 303 37.29 0.33 2.97 15.18 17.16 1.65 18.15 4.29 2.97 0.00
– – – 10 362 38.67 0.83 3.59 26.80 8.56 1.93 12.43 4.97 1.93 0.28
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code percentages of the total number of messages in a given round. For code category
description see Table 13.
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Table A.14: Message Frequencies by Round under PC
nA nB Cost Round N Message Code
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(Irr.) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Rules) (Hist.) (Q?) (Strat.) (Vote) (Abst.) (Amb.)
6 4 0.1 1 325 23.08 1.23 4.62 20.92 0.92 4.31 41.54 1.54 1.54 0.31
– – – 2 253 20.16 1.58 7.11 25.69 2.37 1.58 37.15 0.40 3.95 0.00
– – – 3 595 15.13 0.34 4.37 12.77 2.52 1.34 62.52 0.34 0.67 0.00
– – – 4 440 18.86 0.91 1.36 16.59 4.09 1.14 55.23 0.91 0.91 0.00
– – – 5 479 23.59 1.25 2.51 13.57 3.34 0.63 54.07 0.21 0.84 0.00
– – – 6 406 29.56 0.25 2.96 12.07 5.17 2.22 46.06 0.99 0.49 0.25
– – – 7 355 26.48 0.28 1.69 18.03 5.63 0.56 43.10 1.41 2.82 0.00
– – – 8 348 51.44 0.86 2.59 13.22 7.18 1.72 20.40 0.57 1.44 0.57
– – – 9 343 34.99 0.00 2.33 16.62 2.92 3.79 36.15 0.87 2.33 0.00
– – – 10 358 53.63 0.28 2.51 12.29 4.19 1.40 24.86 0.00 0.84 0.00
– – 0.3 1 234 26.07 1.71 7.26 29.91 1.71 2.56 29.06 0.85 0.85 0.00
– – – 2 290 28.97 2.07 6.21 20.69 9.31 1.03 28.97 2.41 0.34 0.00
– – – 3 281 20.64 1.42 6.05 35.94 4.63 2.49 25.27 3.20 0.36 0.00
– – – 4 285 27.37 1.40 4.21 31.93 6.67 0.70 24.21 2.11 1.40 0.00
– – – 5 728 10.58 1.24 1.10 14.01 2.20 0.69 68.68 1.24 0.27 0.00
– – – 6 394 15.74 1.78 3.55 30.96 6.35 1.02 37.82 2.28 0.25 0.25
– – – 7 332 25.90 3.31 3.31 24.40 6.63 1.20 31.33 1.51 2.11 0.30
– – – 8 506 31.23 1.19 3.36 9.29 4.74 1.38 47.04 0.79 0.99 0.00
– – – 9 299 40.80 2.34 4.35 16.05 8.03 0.67 24.41 2.34 1.00 0.00
– – – 10 314 42.68 1.91 2.87 19.43 6.05 1.91 19.43 4.14 1.59 0.00
7 3 0.1 1 346 22.54 0.87 9.54 15.03 2.60 2.02 41.62 2.89 2.02 0.87
– – – 2 299 22.07 2.01 8.36 14.05 9.70 3.01 37.12 1.34 2.34 0.00
– – – 3 329 19.45 0.00 7.90 21.28 3.65 2.74 41.03 1.22 2.74 0.00
– – – 4 317 34.07 1.89 3.79 24.92 4.73 1.26 28.39 0.63 0.32 0.00
– – – 5 326 43.56 0.31 4.91 19.02 2.76 1.23 27.61 0.31 0.00 0.31
– – – 6 415 38.31 1.45 1.93 19.04 3.37 2.17 32.05 0.00 1.20 0.48
– – – 7 323 42.41 0.62 5.26 18.27 5.26 0.93 25.39 0.31 0.93 0.62
– – – 8 342 42.69 0.58 1.75 21.64 3.80 1.46 26.90 1.17 0.00 0.00
– – – 9 389 40.87 0.00 3.08 18.25 2.83 1.29 32.65 0.77 0.26 0.00
– – – 10 458 45.63 0.66 1.31 10.70 3.28 0.87 36.90 0.44 0.22 0.00
– – 0.3 1 285 30.88 1.05 9.12 24.56 2.46 4.56 22.46 2.81 1.05 1.05
– – – 2 270 34.81 1.85 6.30 26.67 4.07 1.11 21.85 1.85 0.37 1.11
– – – 3 277 37.18 4.69 2.89 23.83 7.94 1.08 19.13 1.08 1.81 0.36
– – – 4 279 31.90 3.23 3.94 27.24 8.60 1.79 22.58 0.36 0.00 0.36
– – – 5 346 27.75 12.72 2.02 20.52 13.29 0.87 18.79 1.73 2.31 0.00
– – – 6 278 39.93 3.24 3.24 23.02 7.55 1.08 18.35 0.36 2.52 0.72
– – – 7 270 30.00 1.85 4.81 25.93 11.85 2.96 13.70 5.19 2.96 0.74
– – – 8 316 37.03 0.95 1.58 21.52 13.61 2.85 13.61 6.01 1.27 1.58
– – – 9 307 43.00 2.28 1.30 22.48 7.49 3.26 14.01 2.61 3.26 0.33
– – – 10 278 61.15 0.72 0.72 16.55 2.88 1.44 15.11 0.00 1.44 0.00
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code percentages of the total number of messages in a given round. For code category
description see Table 13.
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Table A.15: Effects of the Number of Messages on Normalised Total Turnout in Communication
Treatments
Communication N Message Code
0+3+9 1 2 4 5+6 7 8
(Irr) (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Hist.) (Q&S) (Vote) (Abst.)
Group 320 0.008 0.028 0.085∗∗∗ 0.029 0.013∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ −0.130∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.050) (0.026) (0.018) (0.005) (0.033) (0.044)
[0.169] [0.582] [0.001] [0.100] [0.006] [0.000] [0.004]
Public 320 0.003 −0.038∗∗∗ 0.025 −0.002 −0.001 0.333∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.013) (0.031) (0.027) (0.001) (0.056) (0.055)
[0.501] [0.004] [0.415] [0.995] [0.342] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code ordered probit estimates of the effects of the
total number of messages per electorate in that category on the normalised total turnout in a given
treatment. For detailed message code description see Table 13. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are computed using N electorate-round level observations. Corresponding p-values are in brackets.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Appendix B Sample Instructions (for online publication)
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research experiment on group decision making. Dur-
ing the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention. So we ask that you follow
instructions carefully. Please do not open other applications on your computer, chat with other
students, read books, or do homework. Also make sure to turn off your cell phone.
For your participation, you will be paid in cash, at the end of the experiment. Different participants
may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions, partly on the
decisions of others, and partly on chance. So it is important that you listen carefully and fully
understand the instructions before we begin. There will be a short comprehension quiz after the
upcoming practice session, which you all need to pass before we can begin the paid matches.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction among you
will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in any way try to com-
municate with other participants during the experiments, except according to the rules described in
these instructions. We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you
will be given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers.
If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be
answered out loud so everyone can hear. If any difficulties arise after the experiment has begun,
raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you privately.
This experiment consists of two different parts. The instructions for part 2 will be delivered after
part 1 is completed. At the end of the experiment you will be paid the sum of what you have
earned in both parts, plus the show-up fee of $7. Everyone will be paid in private, and you are
under no obligation to tell others how much you earned.
[Turn on the projector and start the multistage server]
Here are the instructions for part 1. Part 1 consists of several matches. Your earnings in part 1
will be determined as follows: the computer will randomly select two matches from part 1, and you
will be paid what you earned in those two matches. All matches are equally likely to be chosen
as the paid matches. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in points. Your US
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dollar earnings are determined by multiplying your earnings from the paid matches in points by a
conversion rate. In this experiment, the conversion rate is 0.07, meaning that 100 points is worth
$7.
Please click on the Client Multistage icon. This window will appear (SHOW SCREEN 2 [client
information].) Enter your computer name (e.g., SSEL01) in the box that appears and then click
Submit. You will then see this screen. (SHOW SCREEN 3 [initialising].)
Please turn your attention to the screen at the front of the room. We will demonstrate how the
matches are played. Please do not begin unless we tell you to do so. Please have your attention
focused on the stage during this demonstration period.
Once everyone has logged in, you will be randomly assigned to one of two types: type A or type B.
You will see this screen (SHOW SCREEN 4 [user interface, either with or without chat, depending
on treatment].)
At the top of the screen is your player id number. This is your id within your type. Once the first
practice match starts, you will be randomly assigned a type label (A or B) and an id within this
type. You will have the same type label, but your player id may change from match to match.
Below the screen informs you which type you are in and how many members there are of each type.
As you can see, type A has 6 (reverseSequence: 7) members and type B has 4 (reverseSequence:
3) members.
[start here for COMMUNICATION treatments]
Next on the screen is a time counter showing how many seconds you are allowed to chat with
the other [(GC): players of your type /(PC): players] before making your choice. All matches will
have two stages. At the first stage you can use the chat feature to communicate with other [(GC):
players of your type /(PC): players] about the decision making problem. Each message you send or
receive in this chat stage is visible to all players of [(GC): your type, but not to players of the other
type. /(PC): both types]. At the second stage, everyone will be asked to independently choose
between two options, as will be described shortly. Messages sent by you are displayed in red and
have ‘[you]’ at the identifying string. Messages sent by other players are displayed in black. All
messages include the sender’s player id and type label. During the communication stage we require
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you to be courteous and polite to other participants, and also preserve the anonymity of interaction.
That is, you are not allowed to communicate any personal information that might identify you to
other participants. Once the time counter reaches zero, the communication stage is over, and you
will see this screen (SHOW SCREEN 5 [user interface when chat is over, GC or PC].)
[start here for CONTROL CASE (NC); continue here for other treatments]
Next on the screen is a table, describing how your earnings depend on your choice of either X or
Y and on which type has the most members choosing X. The display in front of the room shows
you what the screen looks like for a player of type A. You will choose either X or Y by highlighting
the corresponding row label and clicking with your mouse. (SHOW SCREEN 5x and 5y and 6
[showing highlighting], use screens with chat for communication treatments.) After you and the
other participants have all made your choices of X or Y in a match the screen will change to
highlight the row corresponding to your own choice, and the column of the type which had the
greatest number of players choosing X (SHOW screen for completed match). Your earnings from
each match are computed in the following way. It is very important that you understand this, so
please listen carefully. Suppose you choose X. If your type has more players choosing X than the
other type, then you will earn 105 points, if both types have the same number of players choosing
X, then you will earn 55 points, and if the other type has more players choosing X than your type,
then you will earn 5 points. Alternatively, suppose you choose Y. If your type has more players
choosing X than the other type, then you will earn 115 (high-cost: 135) points, if both types have
the same number of players choosing X, then you will earn 65 (high-cost: 85) points, and if the other
type has more players choosing X than your type, then you will earn 15 (high-cost: 35) points Here
is an example: suppose that one player of type A chose X and two players of type B chose X. Then
the B type has more players choosing X than the A type. Each player of type A who chose X earns
5 points; each player of type A who chose Y earns ten (high-cost: thirty) additional points making
it 15 (high-cost: 35) points; the players of type B who chose X earn 105 points, and each player
of type B who chose Y earns ten (high-cost: thirty) additional points making it 115 (high-cost:
135) points. The bottom of the screen contains a history panel. During the experiment, this panel
will be updated to reflect the history of your past matches. For each match you can see the match
number, your type in that match, your choice, your earnings from that match if it is chosen to be a
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paid match by the computer, and the number of each type choosing X. Your type will remain the
same for all matches. However, the actual membership in your type will be randomly reshuﬄed
after each match. Here is how the matching works (SHOW MATCHING SLIDE). There are 20
people in this room. First, we randomly divide you into two types, A and B. Next, we randomly
pick 6 (reverseSequence: 7) people of type A, 4 (reverseSequence: 3) people of type B, randomly
assign ids within each type and put them together in one group. Then we pick 6 (reverseSequence:
7) remaining people of type A, 4 (reverseSequence: 3) people of type B, randomly assign ids and
put them together in the second group. Next match, we repeat the same process again. Thus,
you will remain the same type, but your player id as well as the other players of your type in your
group will change from match to match. If you have any questions at this time, please raise your
hand and ask your question so that everyone in the room may hear it.
PRACTICE [BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR PRACTICE SESSION]
We will now give you a chance to get used to the computers with a short practice session. Please
take your time, and do not press any keys or use your mouse until instructed to do so. You will
NOT be paid for this session; it is just to allow you to get familiar with the experiment and your
computers. Please pull out your dividers. [start practice]
[NC] Everyone please choose X. Once everyone has made their selection, the results from this first
practice match are displayed on your screen. The outcome of the match is now highlighted. The
number of players who chose X is greater for type A, so the potential payoff from this match (if it
is selected by the computer) is 105 points for players of type A. For players of type B, the potential
payoff is 5 points, since for them it is the other type that has more players choosing X. Remember,
you are not paid for this practice match. We will now proceed to the second practice match. Notice
that you may have been assigned a new player id. Now please everyone chose Y. Once everyone
has made their selection, the results from this second practice match are displayed on your screen.
The number of players who chose X is the same (zero) for both types, so the potential payoff from
this match (if it is selected by the computer) is 65 (high cost: 85) points for players of either type.
We have now completed the practice session, and the quiz popped up.
[COMMUNICATION] Notice that the 110-second communication stage has started. To send a
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message [GC: to the other players of your type/ (PC): to other players], click on the text field,
type in your message and either press Enter or click ‘Send’. [(GC): Remember, each message you
send or receive in this chat is visible to all players of your type, but not to the players of the other
type. / (PC): Remember, each message you send or receive in this chat is visible to all players
of both types.] During the communication stage we require you to be courteous and polite to
other participants, and also preserve the anonymity of interaction. That is, you are not allowed
to communicate any personal information that might identify you to other participants. After the
communication stage is over, please wait for further instructions, and don’t click anywhere.
[Wait for the subjects to chat]
Now that the communication stage is over, please everyone choose X. Once everyone has made their
selection, the outcome of the match is highlighted. The number of players who chose X is greater
for type A, so the potential payoff from this match (if selected by the computer) is 105 points for
players of type A. For players of type B, the potential payoff is 5 points, since for them it is the
other type that has more players choosing X. Remember, you are not paid for this practice match.
We will now proceed to the second practice match. Notice that you may have been assigned a new
player id. This time a 60-second communication stage has started, so that we can move on to the
paid matches quicker. After the communication stage is over, please wait for further instructions.
[Wait for the subjects to chat]
Now please everyone chose Y. Once everyone has made their selection, the results from this second
practice match are displayed on your screen. The number of players who chose X is the same (zero)
for both types, so the potential payoff from this match (if it is selected by the computer) is 65 (high
cost: 85) points for players of either type. We have now completed the practice session, and the
quiz popped up.
[QUIZ] Please read each question carefully and check the correct answer. Once everyone has
answered the questions correctly, you may all go on to the second stage of the quiz. After successfully
completing the second round of questions, we will commence with the first paid session. If you
have questions during the quiz, please raise your hand. [END QUIZ]
The next remaining matches in Part 1 will follow the same rules as the practice session. Let me
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summarise those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. In each match, 6 (reverseSequence:
7) players are assigned to type A, and 4 (reverseSequence: 3) players are assigned to type B. You
may choose X or Y. As you can see on the table of this screen, if you choose X, your payoff will be
105 points if your type has more players choosing X than the other type, 5 points if your type has
fewer players choosing X, and 55 points if both types have the same number of members choosing
X. If you choose Y, your match payoff will be 115 (high-cost: 135) points if your type has more
players choosing X than the other type, 15 (high-cost: 35) points if your type has fewer players
choosing X than the other type, and 65 (high-cost: 85) points, if both types have the same number
of players choosing X. Computer will randomly select two matches from part 1, and in part 1 you
will be paid what you earned in those two matches. All matches are equally likely to be chosen as
paid matches. Are there any questions before we begin the paid matches? [Answer questions.]
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR part 1]
Please begin. (Play matches 1–10.) Part 1 is now over.
[SESSION 2] Here are the instructions for part 2 of the experiment.
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR SESSION 2]
The second part will be slightly different from the first part. Let me summarise those rules before
we start. Please listen carefully. There will be a series of matches in this part. In each match, 7
(reverseSequence: 6) players will be assigned to type A, and 3 (reverseSequence: 4) players will
be assigned to type B. In the first match your type label will be assigned as follows. [SHOW
MATCHING SCREEN] If you were of type B during part 1, you will now be assigned to type A
for all matches. If you were of type A during part 1, in each match there is an equal chance that
you either remain assigned to type A, or will be assigned to type B. So if you were of type A during
part 1, each match now you may have a different type label and player id. If you were in type B
during part 1, your type label will remain the same for all matches in part 2. As before, the actual
membership in your type will be randomly reshuﬄed after each match, so the other members of
your type will change from match to match, as well as your player id even if your keep the same
type. In any case, there is always information at the top of the screen telling you your player id and
which type you are. Your earnings in part 2 will be determined similarly as before. The computer
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will randomly select two matches from part 2, and you will be paid what you earned in those two
matches. All matches are equally likely to be chosen as paid matches. Your total earnings from
the experiment will be the sum of your earnings from both parts, plus the show-up fee. Are there
any questions before we begin the second paid session? Please begin. (Play matches 1–10.) Part 2
is now over. The experiment is now completed. Thank you all very much for participating in this
experiment. Please record your total payoff in U. S. dollars at the experiment record sheet. Please
add your show-up fee of $7 and write down the total, rounded up to the nearest dollar. After you
are done with this, please remain seated. You will be paid in the office at the back of the room
one at a time. Please bring all your things with you when you go to the back office. You can leave
the experiment through the back door of the office. Please refrain from discussing this experiment
while you are waiting to receive payment so that privacy regarding individual choices and payoffs
may be maintained.
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